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The social history of Byzantium is a relatively recent research field. This 
estimation is formed not because there are no studies that can be qualified as par 
excellence “social”, or that concern particular aspects of the social evolution of 
Byzantium, but because most of them are not invested with a theoretical context that 
is necessary when it comes to sociological research approaches. With the exception of 
studies of G. Ostrogorsky, H.-G. Beck, and J. Haldon
1
, which beginn with theory to 
continue with data interpretation −with different information, and therefore different 
emphasis, methodology, and conclusions−, most studies are concerned either with the 
economic framework −especially when it comes to the lower social strata2−, or with 
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 See mostly G. OSTROGORSKY, History of the Byzantine State, translated from German by J. HUSSEY, 
Cornwall 1989; IDEM, Pour l’histoire de la féodalité byzantine, CBHB Subsidia I, Bruxelles 1954; H.-
G. BECK, Konstantinopel. Zur Sozialgeschicte einer früh-mittelalterlichen Hauptstadt, BZ 58, 1965, 11-
45 (hereafter BECK, Konstantinopel); IDEM, H βυζαντινή χιλιετία, transl. D. KOURTOVIK, Aθήνα 1990 
(hereafter BECK, Χιλιετία); J. HALDON, Byzantium in the Seventh Century, Cambridge 1990 (hereafter 
HALDON, Byzantium); IDEM, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production, London – New York 
1993. Theoretical, but not “byzantine” is J. HALDON’S work on Marxist historiography, see Μαρξισμός 
και ιστοριογραφία: πρόσφατες εξελίξεις και σύγχρονες συζητήσεις στη Βρετανία, transl. K. GAGANAKES, 
Μνήμων Θεωρία και Μελέτες Ιστορίας 12.  
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 A. LAIOU, Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire. A Social and Demographic Study, Princeton 
1977; É. PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale àByzance, 4e-7e siècles, Civilisations et 
Sociétés 48, Paris-La Haye 1977 (hereafter PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté); P. LEMERLE, The Agrarian History 
of Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century. The Sources and Problems, Galway 1979 
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pressure groups, political parties and alliances at the upper echelons of society
3
. This 
schematic classification of the bibliography obviously cannot be exhaustive, with 
reference to methodologies and analyses, of the number of studies that have been 
published for the byzantine society, and apologies are due for all those works that are 
not mentioned here
4
. It is, nevertheless, suitable to point out that for many of them, 
the influence of the views of G. Ostrogorsky and A. Kazhdan regarding methodology 
and research approach, has been huge
5
; as a result, there are today many studies on 
the upper and lower social strata, their composition and economic power, or its 
absence.   
This paper will not follow the usual research path. Its subject is the 
investigation of social profiles, as they surface in the byzantine sources and puzzle us 
when it comes to their interpretation and significance for the evolution of byzantine 
society. Profiles compose the contour of social “position” of people or groups. In 
Byzantium profiles are either recognized and accepted or, on the other hand, are used 
to relegate people and groups to a different social, political, or even economic level, 
                                                                                                                                            
(hereafter LEMERLE, Agrarian history); M. Kaplan, Les hommes et la terre à Byzance du VΙe au XΙe 
siècle. Propriété et exploitation du sol, Byzantina Sorbonensia 10, Paris 1992 (hereafter KAPLAN, Les 
hommes et la terre).  
3
 J.-Cl. CHEYNET, Pouvoir et contestations à Byzance (963-1210), Byzantina Sorbonensia 9, Paris 1990 
((hereafter CHEYNET, Pouvoir); V. VLYSSIDOU, Αριστοκρατικές οικογένειες και εξουσία (9ος-10ος αι.). 
Έρευνες πάνω στα διαδοχικά στάδια αντιμετώπισης της αρμενο-παφλαγονικής και της καππαδοκικής 
αριστοκρατίας, Θεσσαλονίκη 2001 (hereafter VLYSSIDOU, Αριστοκρατικές οικογένειες); T. LOUNGHIS, 
Η κοινωνική εξέλιξη στη διάρκεια των λεγόμενων «σκοτεινών αιώνων» (602-867), Αθήνα 20132. An 
encompassing and thorough study of the enterprising groups of the empire, some of which were also in 
a position to exercise pressure on the governments, is still a desideratum. 
4
 A short report is found in the introduction of J. HALDON, (ed.), The Social History of Byzantium, 
Chichester 2009, 2-4 (hereafter Social history). Special reference should be made to P. Yannopoulos, 
La société profane dans l’empire byzantine des VIIe, VIIIe et IXe siècles, Recueil de Travaux 
d’Histoire et de Philologie 6e s., Fasc. 6, Louvain 1975 (hereafter YANNOPOULOS, Société profane), 
who chose the basic distinction between freeborn and slaves, valid also in Byzantium, as his main 
research methodology.  
5
 A. KAZHDAN - S. RONCHEY, L’aristocrazia bizantina dal principio dell’XI alla fine del XII secolo, 
Palermo 1997 (hereafter KAZHDAN-RONCHEY, Aristocrazia); G. OSTROGORSKY, Observations on the 
Aristocracy in Byzantium, DOP 25, 1971, 3-32 (hereafter OSTROGORSKY, Aristocracy); also see the 
studies of Ostrogorsky cited in note 1.  
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in which case we are dealing with the existence of “negative” profiles6. In my opinion 
this approach is much more fitting because in Byzantium there were no delineated 
social boundaries and no group or “class” appears circumscribed within a particular 
set of rules, even though all of them, especially the most powerful ones, no matter 
how small or extended, strove for their continuation, their protection and, finally, for 
the increase of their interests. Profiles display a multilevel function which in my 
opinion helps to understand the byzantine society and to appreciate different social 
groups within their particular contexts of action, as well as to elucidate even more 
complicated social conflicts observed in byzantine history
7
.  
As expected, the study at hand marks not the end, but rather the beginning, of 
a research which is as meticulous as possible, as it strives to understand and explain 
the social terminology used by the Byzantines for the construction of those profiles. 
The groups that have been chosen here −the wealthy, the poor, the noble, the powerful 
and the dynasts− present profiles that clarify social phenomena that are visible in the 
10
th
 and 11
th
 c. Unlike my previous studies that begun without any preconceptions, in 
this case these phenomena dictated which profiles needed to be investigated, because 
their manipulation by the Byzantines themselves is evident in the sources. 
Admittedly, no profile can be exhausted in this paper. Rather, each group is examined 
with regard to particular aspects of its image found in the sources and its profile 
constitutes a primary research result. It is expected that in the future the research on 
the social history of Byzantium with a particular view to social group profiles will 
become more detailed and will be complemented with much more evidence.  
                                                 
6
 See for example I. ANAGNOSTAKIS, Byzantium and Hellas. Some Lesser Known Aspects of the 
Helladic Connection (8
th
-12
th
 Centuries), in: Heaven and Earth. Cities and Countryside in Byzantine 
Greece, ed. J. ALBANI, E. CHALKIA, Athens 2013, 15-29. The profiles of the politikoi and the 
stratiotikoi are two profiles that definitely serve particular political ends, but they are not part of this 
paper.  
7
 If there is a theory that closely fits the examination attempted here, then it is the theory of G. SIMMEL. 
SIMMEL perceived society as a network of social relations that are understood as constant interaction 
among individuals or groups, a process in which beliefs/proclamations/behaviors (modes of expression 
and interaction) are either accepted by other individuals or grous, or adjust according to the content 
they attribute to their behavior. In this framework the formation of social groups is the outcome of the 
individuals’ interaction on a more permanent basis. See D. FRISBY, Georg Simmel, London – New 
York 2002
2
; also see the analysis of M. ANTONOPOULOU, Οι κλασσικοί της κοινωνιολογίας. Κοινωνική 
θεωρία και νεότερη κοινωνία, Athens 2008, 455-507.  
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I. Byzantine perceptions of “society” 
It should be noted from the very beginning that the problem of “social class” 
in Byzantium is in reality nonexistent; the concept is modern and its definition even 
today depends on the circumstances to which it applies, therefore it may change from 
country to country (or even from region to region)
8
. The problem may appear to be 
one of semantics: κοινωνία, meaning “societas” in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, 
was used either as a specific legal term, or as a term that carried with it significant 
legal connotations
9
. In the course of time it provided the main terminology for 
sociology, a modern science that flourished after the 18
th
 c. Similar considerations we 
can make about the term τάξις, which in modern Greek signifies (among other things) 
“class”. In Byzantium, however, the use of the word was twofold: it derived from the 
Latin equivalent ordo, which the Romans were using for the separate social, political 
and religious corps −not for the ensemble of the Roman society; it also derived, as we 
shall see below, from Aristotelian and neo-Platonic principles that defined the 
function of the “state”10. That said, it becomes apparent that when we are searching 
for “social” terms in byzantine sources, the obvious ones, “koinonia” and “taxis” are 
                                                 
8
 D. DASKALAKES, Εισαγωγή στη σύγχρονη κοινωνιολογία, Athens 2009, 402-407.  
9
 Meaning relations of various types, the term κοινωνία was not rare in antiquity; its derivation from 
the verb “κοινωνῶ” meant the binding, responsible and accountable participation in something. 
However, koinonia was assigned a theological connotation particularly by St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. 
John Chrystostom (it is found more rarely in St. Basil and St. Athanasius); it was taken over by the 
neo-platonist Proclus and his student Pseudo-Dionysius, whereby it was combined with the notion of 
taxis. In the Novels of the emperor Justinian I “koinonia” is used to describe sharing in something −in a 
crime or in a procedure, see Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. III: Novellae, ed. R. SCHÖLL-G. KROLL, Berlin 
1904, repr. Germany 1972, 101.29, 611.6 (hereafter CIC III). All through the early byzantine times it is 
used for those joining in a heresy, a meaning which is found again especially in Theodore Studites: 
ὀρθόδοξος κοινωνία, κοινωνία αἱρετικῶν/εἰκονομάχων/ἑτεροδόξων, see G. FATOUROS (ed.), Theodori 
Studitae Epistulae, CFHB 31, no 13.42, 48.247, 479.46, 539.27.  
10
 N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Les listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et Xe siècles, Paris 1972, 22-24 
(hereafter OIKONOMIDÈS, Listes); R. RILINGER, Ordo und Dignitas als soziale Kategorien der 
Römischen Republik, in: IDEM, Ordo und Dignitas: Beiträge zur römischen Verfassungs- und 
Sozialgeschichte, Stuttgart 2007, 95-104, esp. 95-96 (hereafter Ordo und Dignitas); É. PATLAGEAN, Ο 
ελληνικός Μεσαίωνας. Βυζάντιο, 9ος-15ος αι., transl. D. LAMBADA, Athens 2007, 248-249 (hereafter 
PATLAGEAN, Ελληνικός μεσαίωνας); G. BAMBINIOTES, Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής γλώσσας, Athens 
1998, 1759, s.v. τάξις. 
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not really those we are looking for; in reality their employment may be misleading, or 
even out of place.  
Still, there was in Byzantium one term that described the ensemble of people 
within the state frame. The ancient term πολιτεία (polity) encompassed those groups 
of people involved in maintaining the harmony of the state, in helping it to function 
smoothly. The concept is initially inseparable from its constitutional context, which 
developed and flourished in the frame of the ancient πόλις. As a consequence, 
participation in the polity was in reality a legal position, with obligations, rights and 
privileges attached to it. However, considering a polity, meaning a state, as a group of 
people, meant that polity, society and “state” coincided, a basic political idea that was 
elaborated in Platonic and Aristotelian works
11
. But if this was an ideal rather than a 
reality already in antiquity (not each and every inhabitant of a city was a πολίτης, a 
member of the polity), it was much more so for early Byzantium; those who did not 
belong to any of the constituent groups of a politeia lived throughout their lives 
outside the Greek medieval bounds of the byzantine “society”, or, to put it correctly, 
polity. Moreover, those who did belong to a specific group were assigned a particular 
position and had a particular role within the context of a polity; their defining 
characteristics were not those of a “class” but those of their role, and conversely, their 
common role made them one large group. Within each of these groups variation of 
position, wealth, education, duties or occupation, was very high, which meant that 
there was no real “social” unity, indeed, we may even speak of separate subgroups. 
The best example demonstrating this is probably the so-called “senatorial class”, 
which was a class with great disparity of status among its members
12
. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
11
 See Aristotle, Politica, ed. A. WARMINGTON, transl. H. RACKHAM, London – Cambridge Mass. 
19442, repr. 1972, vol. 21, 2, 1252a.1-8 (hereafter Aristotle, Politica), perceived the polity as an 
ensemble of social relations: Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν 
ἀγαθοῦ τινος συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς 
πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ 
πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. Αὕτη δ’ ἐστίν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. See P. 
CARTLEDGE, Greek Political Thought: the Historical Context, in: The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Political Thought, ed. C. ROWE, M. SCHOFIELD, S. HARRISON, M. LANE, Cambridge 2005, 11-
22.   
12
 G. DAGRON, Η γέννηση μιας πρωτεύουσας. Η Κωνσταντινούπολη και οι θεσμοί της από το 330 ως το 
451, transl. M. LOUKAKI, Athens 2000, 195 f. (hereafter DAGRON, Γέννηση); BECK, Konstantinopel, 
19-20; HALDON, Byzantium, 160-172; IDEM, The fate of the Late Roman Senatorial Elite: Extinction or 
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when the state employed the term Ρωμαϊκὴ πολιτεία, Roman polity, it appears to have 
comprised in it all its inhabitants notwithstanding social position, not only the groups 
that were constitutionally engaged in some administrative aspect of the polity
13
.    
One might ask, if all these assertions are correct, what is it that describes 
social position in Byzantium, or what is it that describes its perception? The answer to 
this question cannot be simple. “Position” can only be defined by the state itself, since 
it corresponded to a role in the polity; roles, however, tended to adjust. The 
perception of “social class/position” on the other hand is an entirely different issue, as 
perceptions are influenced by qualities: those assumed by the groups in their effort to 
assert themselves, those assigned to them by other groups in a context of social, 
economic and political collaboration or opposition, or those adopted by the state in its 
effort to overpower social and political agitations. It becomes apparent that a “group” 
is by definition narrower than a “class” −indeed it can only be a small fraction of a 
class− and this explains why we observe so many rivalries among separate groups and 
why it is so hard to define a “class” in Byzantium14. For the profiles that are sketched 
                                                                                                                                            
Transformation? in: The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East. Papers of the first (third, sixth) 
Workshop on Late Antiquity and Early Islam, v. 6: Elites old and new in the Byzantine and early 
Islamic Near East, ed. J. HALDON AND L. CONRAD, Princeton, N.J. 1992/2004, 184-198 (hereafter 
HALDON, Senatorial elite); IDEM, Social Élites, Wealth, and Power, in: Social History, 175-178 
(hereafter HALDON, Social élites); P. MAGDALINO, Court Society and Aristocracy, in: Social History, 
217-218, 224-225 (hereafter MAGDALINO, Court society); G. ALFÖLDY, Ιστορία της Ρωμαϊκής 
κοινωνίας, transl. A. CHANIOTES, Athens 2009, 327-328 (hereafter ALFÖLDY, Ιστορία); A. JONES, The 
Later Roman Empire, 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, Oxford 1964, 388-390, 
545-552 (hereafter JONES, LRE).  
13
 A. KALDELLIS, The Byzantine Republic. People and Power in New Rome, Cambridge Mass. – 
London 2015, 14-19 (hereafter KALDELLIS, Byzantine republic), argues that the byzantine politeia is in 
reality the continuation of the res publica romana. Also see BECK, Χιλιετία, 52 f.  
14
 Cf. BECK, Konstantinopel, 16-20; IDEM, Χιλιετία, 319-349; also see ODB 2, 1371, and A. KAZHDAN, 
Small Social Groupings (Microstructures) in Byzantine Society, in: XVI Internationales 
Byzantinistenkongress, JÖB 32.2, 1982, 3-11. The auhtor speaks about “microstructures” as “small 
social groupings”. The difference between groups and microstructures appears in my understanting to 
be that while microstructures are subjected to, or regulated by, a set of rules (e.g. family, guilds etc), 
groups are larger and they may or may not obey to rules. Guilds themselves are functioning within a 
particular frame pertaining to each guild, but not to the “social class” of their members ad hoc, which 
explains the fact that social profiles of separate guild members differ from each other (cf. the profiles 
of the βάσαυσοι and the ἔμποροι). On guilds see G. MANIATIS, The Guild System in Byzantium and 
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are mostly those of state dependent groups, not of classes, and their existence can be 
explained by the mere fact that there was no real social, political, or legal, 
consolidation of a “class” in Byzantium. But a group is weaker than a class, therefore 
groups are subject to change and they can even be formed and dissolved quite as 
easily as they appeared. It is commonly accepted that Byzantium was an empire in 
which vertical social mobility was feasible and sometimes even easy. “Social 
mobility” as defined today by sociology is not exclusively vertical, but horizontal or 
diagonal; it concerns mostly relations among people or groups of the same or slightly 
different standing and their position within a social context
15
. Nevertheless, it may be 
emphasized that what gives the impression of “vertical mobility” is not the fact that 
social ascend was easy –because on the contrary it was rather difficult to break away 
from the context found at the point of one’s birth− but that social role adaptation in 
Byzantium really permitted some social upgrading (or downgrading, which is easier 
found in the sources); the wide distribution of titles in the 11
th
 c. is a good example of 
this type of social role changing, but it required the possession of substantial amounts 
of gold coin for those involved
16
. The suspension of this policy by Alexios I 
Komnenos meant that the titles died with their holders, and their descendants had no 
chance of being included in the aristocracy of the 12
th
 c., unless, of course, they were 
married into it.  
“Social” and political theories in Byzantium are strongly influenced by ancient 
philosophy. The groups that are initially recognized as “social groups” had acquired a 
constitutional character through age-long constitutional practice during the late 
Roman times, they were, in Beck’s interpretation, electoral corps, such as the senate, 
                                                                                                                                            
Medieval Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis of Organizational Structures, Regulatory 
Mechanisms, and behavioral patterns, Byzantion 76, 2006, 528-529, 535-543. MANIATIS rightfully 
points out that a large number of professionals mentioned in the sources probably belonged to no 
guilds.  
15
 DASKALAKES, as above n. 8, 412-414.  
16
 See N. OIKONOMIDES, Title and income at the Byzantine Court, in: Byzantine Court Culture from 
829 to 1204, ed. H. MAGUIRE, Washington DC 1997, 199-215 (hereafter Byzantine court culture); 
IDEM, The Role of the State in the Economy, in: The Economic History of Byzantium from the Seventh 
through the Fifteenth Century, ed. A. LAIOU et al., Washington, DC, 2002, v. 3, 1008-1010 (hereafter 
EHB 3); P. LEMERLE, Roga et rente d’état au Xe-XIe siècles, REB 25, 1967, 77-100; G. 
OSTROGORSKY, Löhne und Preise in Byzanz, BZ 32, 1932, 304-308.  
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the army and the demoi of Constantinople, and later on, the Church
17
. We only have 
two texts, both anonymous and coming from the 6
th
 c., which reflect the beliefs of the 
Byzantines on the polity. The first is De re strategica (Περὶ στρατηγίας), which deals 
with the polity only in the first chapter, and the second is the treatise De scientia 
politica dialogus. The author of De re strategica attempted to describe the πολιτείας 
μέρη (constituencies of the polity) only in the introduction18. Each μέρος was assigned 
a role in the polity and was placed under the supervision of a “leader”19: these are the 
Church (ἱερατικόν), the council members (συμβουλευτικόν), the judges (νομικόν), and 
the people of commerce (ἐμπορικόν), those who provided products (ὑλικόν), and those 
who served (ὑπηρετικόν)20. Given that the first part of the treatise is lost, there is no 
way of deciding on the hierarchical classification of these “parts of the polity”; in the 
second and third chapter, for example, the νομικὸν and the συμβουλευτικὸν are in a 
reversed order following the ἱερατικόν21. The author also speaks about the χρηματικὸν 
                                                 
17
 H.-G. BECK, Senat und Volk von Konstantinopel, in: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Phil.-Hist. Kl., Sitzungsberichte 1966, 1-75 (: IDEM, Ideen und Realitäten in Byzanz, VR London 1972, 
no XII; hereafter Ideen und Realitäten); IDEM, Χιλιετία, 71-80; I. KARAYANNOPOULOS, Η πολιτική 
θεωρία των Βυζαντινών, Θεσσαλονίκη 1992, 19-20.  
18
 De re strategica has been recently attributed to Syrianus magister as part of his Compedium. This 
work is placed by the researchers in the period between the late 6th–late 9th c. Discussion is still 
inconclusive regarding this point, but concerning our subcect it will suffice to note that the first part on 
the polity can hardly be dated beyond the 6th-7th c.; so far this part has not been taken into 
consideration for dating the text, nor have its sources been traced. See P. RANCE, The Date of the 
Military Compedium of Syrianus Magister (Formerly the Sixth Century Anonymous Byzantinus), BZ 
100, 2007, 701-737 with full bibliography. A general commentary on the first part on the polity is 
found in C. MANGO, Byzantium. The Empire of New Rome, London 1980, 33; KALDELLIS, Byzantine 
republic, 15-16.  
19
 Three Byzantine Military Treatises, ed. G. DENNIS, CFHB 25, Washington, DC, 1985, 14.4-6 
(hereafter DENNIS, Three treatises): ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνάγκη ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων μερῶν ὑφ’ ἡγεμόνι τετάχθαι, 
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ περὶ ἀρχόντων εἰπεῖν πρότερον…  
20
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10. 5-14. As it is mutilated, the assemblies are not mentioned in the 
remaining part of the first chapter, which has the title Τί ἐστιν πολιτεία καὶ πόσα μέρη αὐτῆς.   
21
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 12.6-21, 14.18-37. Quite interestingly, the συμβουλευτικόν, which 
undoubtedly concerns the senate, is placed third in the second chapter, but first after the archons (: 
whom I understand to be the higher dignitaries of the state) in the third chapter. The νομικόν, on the 
other hand, is listed first after the priests in the second chapter and third in the third chapter, which 
analyses the qualities of the archons. This may be an indication of the increased significance of the 
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and the τεχνικὸν (construction workers)22; the χρηματικὸν is analysed in the third part 
of the treatise, concerning the archons: it comprises the administrators of public 
finance (τῶν περὶ τὰ χρήματα τεταγμένων), the tax collectors (τοὺς φορολόγους), the 
financial inspectors (τοὺς ἐπισκεπτομένους) and the “distributors of money” (τοὺς 
διανέμοντας τὰ χρήματα)23. Of these groups, only the merchants appear to be under 
the control of the “supervisors of trade”, meaning almost certainly the supervisors of 
professional corporations
24
.   
Of particular interest are the last categories, the ὑλικόν and the ὑπηρετικὸν, but 
also the ἄχρηστον and the ἀργόν. The ὑλικόν appears to refer to people engaged in 
providing finished products or raw materials, and are specifically distinguished from 
tradesmen
25
. The ὑπηρετικὸν on the other hand concerns a group that either offers 
services to the archons on hire (τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρέτας τῶν εἰρημένων ἀρχόντων), or is 
responsible for the transport of materials to the city
26
. The last two categories have to 
do with the lower social strata, but their economic situation is of no significance for 
their classification by the author. The difference between the two groups is their 
ability to participate in the function of the polity. The ἄχρηστοι are those, to whom 
philanthropy is extended; some natural cause, such as age or infirmity, makes them 
                                                                                                                                            
main legislative authorities of the empire in the 6
th
 c., meaning the prefect of the city and the quaestor 
sacri palatii.  
22
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 12.14-21. The τεχνικὸν does not appear again; in its place there seems to be 
comprised a group of those occupied in the sciences and technical services (ibid., 16.71-75, τοὺς περὶ 
τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τέχνας ἀπησχολημένους).  
23
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 14.37-16.70.  
24
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 16.76-80.  
25
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10.11-12, 16.81-18.87.  
26
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10.13-14, 18.98-100. In any case there appears no personal clientele relation 
between the archons and the ὑπηρετικόν, unless we reject Dennis’ translation, “those who hire out their 
services”, and we consider them to be subaltern employees of the archons instead. In this case the 
anonymous author would consider that employees and transporters such as the ξυλοφόροι, ἀχθοφόροι, 
λιθοφόροι, belong to the same group. There is good evidence that the lower administrative staff was 
classified with the lower social strata, as indicated by Theodosiani Libri XVI cum Constitutionibus 
Sirmondianis, ed. Th. MOMMSEN, Dublin-Zurich 1904, repr. Germany 1971, 14.10.3, 16.5.54.7 
(hereafter C.Th.) −see the translation in C. PHARR, The Theodosian Code and Novels and the 
Sirmondian Constitutions, Princeton 1952, 415, 460, were they suffer corporal punishments and exile 
“since they have no respect to lose”.     
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“useless” for the community (μηδοτιοῦν συντελεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν κοινῶν χρείαν)27. But 
the author of De re strategica apparently feels uncomfortable with the existence of 
people who are “not engaged in any activity”; they constitute the ἀργόν, a “class of 
the unoccupied”. The author adds: οὐ πάντως καὶ ἡμῖν ἁρμόσει μέρος πολιτείας 
τοιοῦτον (in my perception such a class of citizens in no way becomes us), to 
conclude that those without a profession “should take their place in one of the orders” 
(καθ’ ἔν τι τῶν εἰρημένων τετάξεται), in other words, he suggests that they should be 
given a profession
28
. Of note is the fact that the author is not concerned about the 
place of other professional groups, such as the γραμματικοί, ἰατροί, γεωργοί, who are 
mentioned only once in the beginning of the mutilated text
29
. It is possible that some 
small contribution to the function of the polity was also acknowledged to them as 
well, or that they were included in the sphere of influence of the superior “classes”, 
exactly as other μέρη mentioned in the text. This particular organization of society 
portrayed in De re strategica reflects city structures, where the professional guilds 
were dominating civil life. Classification by profession was standard in Late Roman 
times
30
.   
The author of the second text, the De scientia politica dialogus
31
, attributes to 
the city groups the term τάγματα (orders). He distinguishes the people into the sacred 
order (τὸ ἱερατικὸν), the optimates (ἄριστοι), and the military and civil orders, which 
                                                 
27
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10.14-16, 18.88-93.  
28
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10.17-25. I rejected DENNIS’ translation of this part, but I kept the 
translation of the phrase “class of citizens” for “μέρος πολιτείας”. Also “class of the unoccupied” I 
think reflects better the meaning of the text instead of “leisure class” of DENNIS.   
29
 DENNIS, Three treatises, 10.4.  
30
 E. PAPAGIANNI, Byzantine Legislation on Economic Activity Relative to Social Class, in: EHB 3, 
1083-1085. The author remarks that this aspect of social categorization has been not yet adequately 
studied.  
31
 The work was attributed to Peter the patrikios, who served Justinian I as magister officiorum for 26 
consecutive years, but this view has been convincingly contested. See P. BELL, Three Political Voices 
from the Age of Justinian. Agapetus, Advice to the Emperor, Dialogue on Political Science, Paul the 
Silentiary, Description of Hagia Sophia, Translated texts for Historians 52, Liverpool 2009, 9-13 
(hereafter BELL, Three political voices); F. DVORNIK, Early Christian and Byzantine Political 
philosophy. Origins and Background, vol. II Washington, DC, 1966, 706; A. CAMERON, Procopius and 
the Sixth Century, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1985, 248-252; H. HUNGER, Βυζαντινή λογοτεχνία. Η λόγια 
κοσμική γραμματεία των Βυζαντινών, v. 2, transl. T. KOLIAS, K. SYNELLE, G. MAKRES, I. VASSIS, 
Athens 1992, 91-94; ODB 3, 1629-1630, sv Peri politikes epistemes.  
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are also called συστήματα −the term refers to professional corporations only in one 
instance. The authority structures spring directly from the “royal principles” (ἐκ τῶν 
ἐνόντων λόγων) which reflect the order of God and result in the “well-being and 
stability of the state” (εὐεξία τε καὶ εὐστάθεια)32. As in De re strategica, the people are 
categorized by profession, and all professionals are a subject of control and 
supervision by the optimates, even the farmers and the most humble folk of the 
cities
33
. The author avoids to reach the point where the power of the optimates 
replaces that of the emperor’s, nevertheless, the role of the emperor is pushed in the 
background; it appears as if his presence in the text serves solely the maintenance of 
the “order of authorities” (ταξιαρχίας)34, which alone can guarantee the maintenance 
of social structure. The emperor may represent on earth an authority “similar to that 
of God”35, but this in no way requires his active involvement in the governance of the 
empire, which should be left to the optimates
36
. Much more than De re strategica, the 
Dialog is a neo-platonic treatise, apparently with strong Pseudo-Dionysian influences, 
which are manifest in the particular structure of optimate power called taxiarchia
37
. 
The model, however, is not used to strengthen imperial power, but to restrain it
38
. The 
                                                 
32
 Menae patricii cum Thoma referendatio De scientia politica dialogus, ed. C. M. MAZZUCHI, Milano 
2002, 31-32 (hereafter De scientia politica); BELL, Three political voices, 158.  
33
 De scientia politica, 34-37, and 34.13-17 for the unemployed and the beggars; BELL, Three political 
voices, 161-164.  
34
 De scientia politica, 23.8-15; BELL, Three political voices, 149. The author translates taxiarchia as 
“political order”.  
35
 De scientia politica, 44.10-11; BELL, Three political voices, 170.  
36
 De scientia politica, 47.7-16; BELL, Three political voices, 173.  
37
 In Pseudo-Dionysius taxiarchia is the supreme power and authority which commands the 
hierarchical procession. See G. HEIL AND A. M. RITTER, Corpus Dionysiacum, II. Pseudo-Dionysius 
Areopagita, De coelesti hierarchia, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, De mystica theologia, Epistulae, 
Patristische Texte und Studien 67, Berlin, 2012
2
, 22.14-22 (hereafter Pseudo Dionysius).  
38
 BELL, Three political voices, 73-76, 173 note 126, noted that the text contains “a secular equivalent 
of Ps. Dionysius’ similarly Neoplatonic vision”, but the imperial authority “is mediated through the 
levels of the secular hierarchies” and this puts “a general constraint on the imperial exercise of 
authority”. Also see IDEM, Social conflict in the Age of Justinian. Its Nature, Management, and 
Mediation, Oxford 2013, 275-277 (hereafter BELL, Social conflict); Ch. PAZDERNIK, Justinianic 
Ideology and the Power of the Past, in: The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian, ed. M. 
MAAS, Cambridge 2005, 195 (hereafter The age of Justinian), sees the text as portraying a 
“bureaucratic notion of the Christian oikoumene”. Also see DVORNIK, as above n. 31, 707. 
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underlying critique reveals quite clearly the tensions between the upper classes of 
Byzantium and the emperor Justinian I. The anonymous author appears to be 
profoundly concerned with the preservation of the order of the ἄριστοι; under the 
conviction that it would contribute to the recognition of their own authority, he even 
claims that the optimates should protect the lower orders from ill-treatment by the 
powerful
39
, a role that had been assumed by the state itself and was very strongly 
propagated in the legislation of Justinian I, as we shall see below.   
Theoretical analyses of this type are modeled on the ideal Platonic polis as an 
institutional establishment, as a politeia, even if discussion is transferred to an empire-
wide level. Thus the author of the Dialog speaks about the “leaders of all the city 
orders” (τῶν τῆς πόλεως πάντων ταγμάτων), who are responsible for electing the 
emperor from among the optimates
40
, who, in their turn, are responsible for exercising 
control over the lower social strata. However, at the time of the writing of these texts, 
political and “social” considerations of this type were expressions of a reality that was 
dying. Considering a “polity”, meaning a “society”, exclusively within the bounds of 
a city −a polis−, was an integral part of the political and philosophical tradition of 
antiquity, but had little to do with real conditions. The claims of the authors lay in 
apparent contradiction with the existence of a central authority which overshadowed 
and suppressed all aspirations of persons and groups to autonomy and personal power 
and absorbed all peripheral competences for itself. “Aristocratic” self-existence was 
no longer maintainable, because the frame sustaining it through the superintendence 
of its activities, meaning the frame of the polis, was dissolving. The state had long 
appropriated the most important functions of the cities and had weakened the city as 
an institution
41
. Effectively all power derives from the center, and the emperor is no 
more a “primus inter pares”, no more the guarantor of the self-existing autonomous 
power centers of the optimates −as the anonymous author of De scientia politica 
would like−, but, as in the neo-platonic protype, the emperor is the only source of 
                                                 
39
 De scientia politica, 37.13-18. On possible conflicts within the order of the optimates see R. 
DOSTALOVA, Soziale Spannungen des 5/6 Jh. in Byzanz im Spiegel des anonymen Dialogs Περὶ 
πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eine Quellenanalyse, in: F. WINKELMANN (ed.), Volk und Herrschaft im fruhen 
Byzanz. Methodische und quellenkritische Probleme, BBA 58, Berlin 1991, 33-48.   
40
 De scientia politica, 30.10-12.  
41
 The development is a result of decay of the autonomous administration of the cities. See A. JONES, 
The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian, Oxford 1940, 147-155; IDEM, LRE, 535-542.  
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power, which is granted and taken away for specific purposes. The system no longer 
favored the upper social strata of the empire, as it lifted the privileges attached to 
personal distinction in the provinces and confined them to those involved in active 
administration
42
. The Novels of Justinian I show that there was no way to impose the 
involvement of local magnates in city management and the archaeological material 
suggests that they were abandoning their civic residences in favor of their provincial 
villas
43
. It appears that the upper social strata of the empire would soon be in need to 
modify the ways of their social self-projection.     
 
II. Basic “social” distinctions found in the legislation    
In her seminal work on poverty, Evelyne Patlagean maintais that the basic 
social distinction of the Roman empire into honestiores and humiliores developed 
with time into a general distinction between rich and poor in middle Byzantium. 
According to that theory, the distinction was maintained in the legislation of Justinian 
I and poverty, as portrayed in the punishments reserved for the poor in the Roman 
laws, reflects a real condition of social weakness next to the influence of the rich and 
powerful
44
. This theory has deeply affected the scientific approach regarding social 
class divisions in Byzantium but needs to be revised for two reasons, firstly, because 
Roman legislation has been closely investigated recently regarding “social” 
distinctions found in the legislation, and secondly, because an unprejudiced inspection 
                                                 
42
 JONES, LRE, 535-542; DAGRON, Γέννηση, 188-195. P. BROWN, Power and Persuasion in Late 
Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire, Wiskonsin 1992, 71-117, argued that bishops filled in the void 
created by the retreat of the civic upper social strata, a development facilitated by the function of the 
Church as a major benefactor of the poor. The transformation of civic euergetism into euergetism 
targeting the poor is an idea elaborated by the same author in Poverty and Leadersphip in the Later 
Roman Empire, Hanover – London 2002, 1-44 (hereafter BROWN, Poverty).  
43
 H. SARADI, Από την καθημερινότητα του πρωτοβυζαντινού αριστοκράτη, στο: Βυζαντινό κράτος και 
κοινωνία. Σύγχρονες κατευθύνσεις της έρευνας, NHRF, Athens 2003, 72-85; see generally JONES, LRE, 
757-763.  
44
 PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté, 10-11. See, however, the critique of J. HALDON, On the Structuralist 
Approach to the Social History of Byzantium, BSl 42, 1981, 203-211. Also see ALFOLDY, Ιστορία, 190-
196, 277, 302-308, 345-349, who argues for a leveling of distinctions among different groups of the 
lower social strata, which led to an assimilation of the humiliores with the plebs and the coloni. Also 
see BROWN, Poverty, 7-8, 52-54: “this view from the top gives way to a picture of the population… as 
built up by layer upon layer of humble persons”.  
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of the texts examined by Patlagean produces different results, especially when it 
comes to interpreting the laws.  
In the second and third centuries the Roman empire used the honestiores-
humiliores distinction in such vague contexts that required no further specification. 
The division therefore served no particular purposes and it is not easy to decide which 
person belonged to either category, unless this detail is included in a source
45
. In 
judicial procedures this general social classification is not evoked as a direct cause of 
punishment, but rather, punishment is a secondary consequence, even though different 
sets of punishments are predicted for the categories of the honestiores and 
humiliores
46
. A more detailed examination of the condicio of persons is part of any 
normal court procedure. “Social position” in Roman times was determined by one’s 
participation in overlapping circles of political, religious and economic character, 
which preconditioned particular rights and obligations for their members and 
established their condicio, in reality their social, and specifically for the court, their 
legal status, such as senator/decurion, free/freedman or slave, patronus, public 
servant (whereby one belonged to the Roman militia) or not
47
. When it comes to legal 
responsibility, persons are equally examined for their liability independently of their 
status, e.g. in case of testifying, because moral standards are attached to each 
condition
48
. In this context, some categories are excluded from bringing actions to 
                                                 
45
 R. RILINGER, Zeugenbeweiss und Sozialstruktur in der Römischen Kaiserzeit, in: IDEM, Ordo und 
Dignitas, 239-243 (hereafter RILINGER, Zeugenbeweiss), points out that the comparative of honestus is 
found only three times in Justinian’s Codex.  
46
 R. RILINGER, Humiliores – Honestiores. Zu einer sozialen Dichotomie im Strafrecht der römischen 
Kaiserzeit, München 1988, 56-60, 63-64 (hereafter RILINGER, Humiliores–honestiores). In other words, 
it is nowhere mentioned that a punishment is inflicted because an individual is classified as honestior 
or humilior.  
47
 RILINGER, Humiliores-honestiores, 51-56, 110-111. Other types of condicio may be found in the 
early sources, relating to wealth (defined by census in Rome), birth (patrician, plebeian or other), 
citizenship (coming from Rome, Italy or allied cities etc); in sum, these distinctions defined the 
political rights of a person and attainment of honors. JONES, LRE, 519, believed that the distinction was 
generally inconsequential, as even the professionals could claim the status of honestior at least in a 
court of law. When it came to conferring justice it was left to the judge to decide if one of the litigants 
belonged to the humiliores or not, in which case he would suffer the punishment predicted for his case.  
48
 Cf. also Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. I: Institutiones, Digesta, rec. P. KRUEGER – TH. MOMMSEN, 
Berolini 1872, repr. Germany 1973, 22.5.2 (hereafter Digesta): In testimoniis autem dignitas fides 
mores gravitas examinanda est: et ideo testes, qui adversus fidem suae testationis vacillant, audienti 
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court, and others are not admitted as witnesses. These categories overlap only partly 
because of their condicio, not because of their social standing
49
. It follows that 
confusing these groups and generalizing to the point of considering that all humiliores 
were poor is an oversimplification that perplexes any attempt to decifer the complex 
relations among separate social groups in Byzantium. The simpler example 
demonstrating this would be the assimilation of the infames with the humiliores and, 
for this reason, with the poor. But the infames were a clearly legal, not social, 
category; persons of any social “class” could be stigmatized with infamia (ignominy), 
therefore the infames cannot even be considered a “group” 50.   
The perception of such socio-legal distinctions is best followed in the laws 
relating to penalties and witnesses. In a law dated to 414 the handling of the upper 
social strata is expanded: it is distinguished into private persons and dignitaries 
(personis singulis et dignitatibus), followed by proconsulares, vicarii and comites 
primi ordinis
51
; a separate category is composed of honoratos reliquos, which relates 
                                                                                                                                            
non sunt (The rank, the integrity, the manners, and the gravity of witnesses should be taken into 
consideration, and therefore those who make contradictory statements, or who hesitate while giving 
their evidence, should not be heard). Digesta has been translated by A. WATSON, The Digest of 
Justinian, Philadelphia 1998
2
. Here, however, the translation of S. SCOTT is preferred, which has been 
corrected and is available on line (http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Anglica/codjust_Scott.htm). See 
RILINGER, Humiliores-honestiores, 133, 134-136; IDEM, Zeugenbeweiss, 225-229, 232-243.   
49
 C. HUMFRESS, Civil Law and Social Life, in: The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine, 
ed. N. LENSKI, Cambridge 2006, 205-225 (hereafter HUMFRESS, Civil law). The author speaks about 
those who “fall between the legal cracks”, a qualification that concerns the categories that are never 
defined specifically in the legislation; more details are found about them when we have data on specific 
cases.   
50
 The infamia was handled particularly in Digesta, 3.2: De his qui notantur infamia, and Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, vol. II: Codex Justinianus, ed. P. KRUEGER, Berolini 1877, repr. Germany 1967, 2.12 (hereafter 
CJ): De causis ex quibus infamia alicui inrogatur. SCOTT’s translation of the Codex is found in 
http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr/Anglica/codjust_Scott.htm. Infamia referred to legal status 
resulting from an act, consequently also from the profession chosen; its imposition was pursued in the 
public interest; therefore it incurred the deprivation of a person’s right to exercise his public duties. An 
informative entry on infamia is found in A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, ed. W. SMITH, 
W. WAYTE, F. MARINDIN, London 1890, 1006-1008 (also found online).   
51
 JONES, LRE, 526; DAGRON, Γέννηση, 217-218. The comites were a particular order of “imperial 
companions”, with specific duties, or simply holders of the corresponding honorary title who entered 
that order. This class was inflated in the 4
th
 c., but the title still gave precedence in the sacrum 
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to senatores and decemprimi curiales. The last category is the city decuriones. By 
contrast, the lower social strata, generally marked as “kinds of people” are simply 
divided in slaves and coloni (servos et colonos… generibus hominum). In a similar 
law of 412, which distinguishes among illustres, spectabiles and clarissimi, the plebs 
are also mentioned
52
. A law comprised in the Digesta of Justinian I contains pairs of 
social opposites: decurions-plebeians, honorable-dishonorable, rich and poor. The 
legislator in this law was much more concerned with someone’s position and way of 
life −the condicio− rather than with a particular “social” standing53. The general 
distinction between decurions and plebeians is often found in the Codex of 
Theodosius, but the distinction between rich and poor is not common –more often 
than not poverty appears in the sources as cause of unlawfulness or of lack of moral 
content in a person, not of social status
54
.  
The concern about the liability of witnesses with intention to safeguard and 
reinforce the unobstructed dispensation of justice is particularly evident in Justinian’s 
Novel 90 On witnesses. In this Novel Justinian I explains that previous laws barring 
witnesses from testifying were abused and for this reason he intends to clarify which 
categories of people and under what circumstances should be excluded from placing 
their testimony
55
. The emperor maintains that witnesses should be chosen among 
people “with a good reputation” (εὐυπολήπτους δεῖν εἶναι τοὺς μάρτυρας), and 
explains that to this group belong the title holders, those who have a position in state 
service and those who are known for their wealth or for their profession (διὰ τὸ τῆς 
                                                                                                                                            
consistorium and in the senate; its bestowal included senatorial rank for those who did not already have 
it.  
52
 C.Th, 16.5.52, 16.5.54.3, 4, 7, 8; ALFOLDY, Ιστορία, 326; DAGRON, Γέννηση, 194. The lower staff of 
the dignitaries (officiales) also belonged to the lower social strata as mentioned above, n. 26; the priests 
were counted in the second category with the civic magistrates. On the prohibition to heretics to appear 
at court see D. SIMON, Untersuchungen zum Justinianischen Zivilprozess, München 1969, 239-240 
(hereafter SIMON, Zivilprozess).  
53
 Digesta, 22.5.3: Testium fides… in persona eorum exploranda… in primis condicio cuiusque utrum 
quis decurio an plebeius sit… an honestae et inculpatae vitae … an vero notatus quis et 
reprehensibilis… an locuples vel egens sit, ut lucri causa quid facile admittat. Extensive commentary 
on this important law is found in RILINGER, Zeugenbeweiss, 243-251. 
  
54
 W. MAYER, Poverty and Generosity toward the poor in the time of John Chrysostom, in: Wealth and 
Poverty in Early Church and Society, ed. S. HOLMAN, Michigan 2008, 149-154.  
55
 CIC III, no 445.16-446.2.   
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ἀξίας ἢ στρατείας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἀναμφισβήτητον). This part may be 
easily interpreted as projecting a social distinction generally based on wealth, but such 
an interpretation is an oversimplification, for the emperor continues with specifying 
the groups that are excluded from a judicial process: the circus people, the “lowly” 
and the unknown (μή τινας ἐπιδιφρίους μηδὲ χαμερπεῖς μηδὲ παντοίως ἀσήμους… Εἰ 
δὲ ἄγνωστοί τινες εἶεν καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀφανεῖς…). The circus/hippodrome people in 
the Roman empire were stigmatized with permanent infamia
56
. The main 
consideration of the law of Justinian was the ability of the witnesses to prove, even 
through the testimony of others, that they were reliable persons, leading a respectable 
life, which was proof of honesty (ὑφ’ ἑτέρων γοῦν ὅτι καθεστᾶσιν ἀξιόπιστοι 
μαρτυρούμενοι)57. The latter category, the “unknown”, is the ἀφανεῖς or ἄγνωστοι of 
the Greek sources
58
. Even though an effort has been made to equate this category with 
the infames or the poor
59
, the equation cannot stand. The Greek equivalent of the 
infames would be ἄτιμοι or ἄσημοι, as opposed to ἔντιμοι, ἐντιμότεροι, which is the 
Greek translation of honestiores. The criterion for being relegated to the ἄγνωστοι 
appears to be the lack of permanent residence, resulting from unemployment. 
Employment would have effected the registration of a person in a catalogue of 
professional workers or farmers, after which the person would be no longer 
“unknown”. One wonders if the “unknown” are a forerunning distinction for the 
                                                 
56
 HUMFRESS, Civil law, 210; SP. TROIANOS, Οι ποινές στο Βυζαντινό δίκαιο, in: Έγκλημα και τιμωρία 
στο Βυζάντιο, ed. SP. TROIANOS, Athens 2001, 47 (hereafter Troianos, Οι ποινές); SIMON, Zivilprozess, 
237-239. SIMON does not comment on infamia. 
57
 CIC III, no 90, 446.21-30.   
58
 CIC III, no 90, 446.30-33. These are subjected to torture in case they are suspected for corrupting the 
process.  
59
 PATLAGEAN, Pauvreté, 14-17, believes that the infames are assimilated to the humiliores, therefore 
they are excluded from a court procedure; EADEM, La pauvreté à Byzance au temps de Justinien: les 
origines d’un modèle politique, Études sur l’histoire de la pauvreté (Moyen Âge – XVIe siècle), I, ed. 
M. MOLLAT, Paris 1974, 59-81, here 59-67 (hereafter PATLAGEAN, La pauvreté) [: EADEM, Structure 
sociale, famille, chretienté à Byzance, VR London 1981, no I; hereafter PATLAGEAN, Structure 
sociale]; H. KRUMPHOLZ, Über Sozialstaatliche Aspekte in der Novellengesetzgebung Justinians, 
Habelts Dissertationsdrucke, Reihe Alte Geschicte 34, Bonn 1992, 26-27 (hereafter KRUMPHOLZ, 
Aspekte); RILINGER, Humiliores-honestiores, 110-112, notes that there is no explicit prohibition for the 
infames to bring actions to court; however, I might add, as in the case of the poor which is discussed 
below, this would expose them to attacks on the part of the prosecuted that could effect the annulement 
of the trial altogether.    
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ἄγνωστοι καὶ ἀνεπίγνωστοι τῷ δημοσίῳ (completely unknown to the public fisc)60, 
found in documents after the 10
th
 c. In my opinion they are, and the Novel of Justinian 
I distinctly differentiates the infames from the “unknown and those who are nowhere 
to be seen”, we are therefore dealing with separate groups of Byzantine society, and 
not simply with “the poor”61.  
In the 7th c., a text containing penalties imposed on heretics is most 
elucidating regarding the social divisions that the state recognized. It was included in 
the acts of the Lateran Council and dates from 649
62
. The change affected in the 
Byzantine perception of “society” since the early 5th c. is most obvious in this 
stipulation, even though anticipated already in the Novels of Justinian I. Four large 
groups are mentioned along with the penalties that are deemed fitting for their status. 
The first is, as expected, the clergy of all grades, followed by the monks, a group that 
is normally held outside the Byzantine polity because of its members’ deliberate 
retreat from the world
63
. The second is the large group of state servants: εἰ δὲ ἀξίαν ἢ 
ζώνην ἢ στρατείαν ἔχοιεν, γυμνωθήσονται τούτων (if they hold/have title, office or 
service, they shall be deprived of it). The translation of the terms used in this sentence 
varies: ἀξία may be interpreted as “title” or “function”, ζώνη as “title/function” but 
also as military service
64
, στρατεία as “military service” as well as “any state service”. 
In any case, these terms denote the state dependent groups of dignitaries of any rank 
and those who provided their services either in the military or in the political and civil 
sector. The last group is the private persons, ἰδιῶται. In Byzantium the term idiōtes is 
conceived in a twofold manner: it may signify the person who leads a private life 
away from public affairs, but also (in the Novels of Justinian I and later) the person 
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 G. OSTROGORSKIJ, Quelques problèmes d’histoire de la paysannerie byzantine, CBHB, Subsidia II, 
Bruxelles 1956, 36.     
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 Also SIMON, Zivilprozess, 239: “die Unbekannten, …die ohne festen Wohnsitz sind”.  
62
 Concilium Lateranense a. 649 Celebratum, ed. R. RIEDINGER, Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum 
Series Secunda vol. I., Berolini 1984, 210.6-15. I sincerely thank the senior researcher of the 
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 C. RAPP, City and Citizenship as Christian Concepts of Community in Late Antiquity, in: The City in 
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who serves in the political sector of the administration
65
. Here the first is meant; the 
ἰδιῶται are therefore distinguished into ἐπίσημοι (notables) and ἀφανεῖς (unknown). 
We understand that the episemoi are persons with assets; their wealth is confiscated in 
case they are found heretics. The aphaneis, as explained above, are the exact opposite. 
They are not marked for their wealth because they have no assets in the form of 
movable or immovable possessions, therefore they remain “unknown”; if they are 
found heretics, they simply have to suffer corporal punishment and exile.  
The testimonies examined so far suggest that a change occurred in the social 
perception of the Byzantines, which became clearer between the 6th and the 7th c. and 
is expressed in the abrogation of the limits among different groups of the byzantine 
society. This change is manifest mostly in the upper social strata that are no longer 
divided among the earlier ordines of comites, decuriones, honorati, etc. By the time 
of Justinian I, but more clearly in the 7th c., the real social section is found there, 
where a subject of the empire entered public service, or, to put it clearly, entered the 
state payroll or became eligible for some privilege in return for the provided service. 
This division is not new, it is of Roman provenance, but it is all that is maintained in 
middle Byzantium
66
. State service is conceived as a condition to which a set of 
privileges is attached; the removal of militia/strateia causes the political, economic 
and ultimately the social debasement of the individual who serves. Of major 
significance is an important observation, that “nobility”, εὐγένεια, and poverty, πενία, 
are of no consequence for the distinctions that the state acknowleged. Poor people 
with moderate or small fortunes would be counted with the ἰδιῶται, not with the 
ἀφανεῖς. This simplified classification does not mean that separate social groups were 
reduced to nothingness. On the contrary, I suggest that byzantine “social” perception 
expanded to include everybody, notwithstanding wealth, position, nobility; persons of 
noble birth or not, rich or poor, large or medium landowners, dependent farmers or 
professionals without any land at all might be included in either category. The 
leveling of social distinctions among different social groups in the 6th-7th c. led to a 
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restructuring of separate groups’ role in, and self-projection to, society. However, the 
most important consequence of this development is in my appreciation the claim the 
state laid to the lower social strata, the protection of which was usurped from the 
aristocracy; this becomes amply clear in the prooimion of the Ecloga.   
In this text the legislator brings two socially opposite groups into contrast in 
the same context, the πένητες (the poor) and the δυνάσται (the dynasts)67. What 
follows is to a point word by word copy from St. Basil, who had used the substantive 
participles πλεονεκτοῦντες (the avaricious), ὑπερέχοντες (the superior) and 
ἀδικούμενον (the injured). St. Basil was proclaiming that the superior should not be 
deprived more than the amount of damage they had inflicted on the aggrieved 
(ἐπανισοῦν αὐτοὺς ἵστασθαι καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος ὅσον ἐλαττούμενον 
εὕρωσι τηνικαῦτα τὸν ἀδικούμενον)68. This formulation is in accordance with the late 
Roman idea of justice, which accommodated the existence of wealth, often immense, 
in a Christian context. In fact, it was St. Basil who exposed the desire for more 
possessions of the rich and elaborated on avarice; but, so long as the wealthy abstain 
from obtaining more riches, assets and means, provided that they care for the situation 
of their people and channel their financial aid to the poor –no more to society in 
general−, wealth is exonerated. In this idea the existence of wealth and the wealthy, 
and the continuation of social inequality were unexpectedly justified
69
. However, the 
author of Ecloga was not absolutely pleased with St. Basil’s notion of justice, he 
therefore framed it in a background of marked conflict of the socially powerful −the 
dynasts− with the socially weak −the poor: “neither despise of the poor, nor allow the 
dynast to act unrestrained” (μήτε πένητος καταφρονεῖν μήτε δυνάστην ἐᾶν 
ἀνεξέλεγκτον). The legislator expands the principle of justice by interweaving with it 
the idea that administering justice is not compatible with discrimination which derives 
from, or is founded on, money, partiality, enmity or fear of dynasty (ἢ χρήμασι 
διεφθαρμένοι ἢ φιλίᾳ χαριζόμενοι ἢ ἔχθραν ἀμυνόμενοι ἢ δυναστείαν 
δυσωπούμενοι). This suggestion is specifically directed to the judges, who in case 
they have committed such a mistake are unqualified to confer judgment (κρίμα 
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κατευθύνειν οὐ δύνανται).  
Ecloga, however, is not all that innovating. In spite of the fact that it is 
distanced from the Roman legislation with respect to dispensing justice as a 
fundamental principle of equity of the people before the law and not as a task that 
simply burdens the administration of the empire
70
, the stipulation on witnesses is only 
a summary of Justinian’s Novel 90. But a few years later in the same century, the 
related Novel of the empress Irene makes no reference to the category of the 
“unknown”, the ἀφανεῖς71. With this development Byzantium leaves its Roman social 
past behind. The disappearance of the last social category from the legislation of the 
period represents the last step towards a uniform comprehension of society, one that 
makes the lower social strata a clear target of imperial protection against those who 
constantly expanded their own financial, political and social power. In some respect, 
this development reflects Byzantium’s recognition of the weaker groups’ subsistence 
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th
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right outside the social influence circles of the group that is called “the powerful” −in 
reality, as Ecloga indicates, it appears to be directly targeting at the patronage and 
clientele social organization of Roman times.  
 
III. The “powerful” and the dynasts 
It has already been pointed out that the difference between the Roman and the 
Byzantine perception of social distinctions is manifest in the terminology of the 
legislation. There is one more, actually major, distinction that needs to be elucidated, 
and that is the one that concerns the δυνατοί (the powerful) and the δυνάσται (the 
dynasts). The use of these terms reproduces conceptions of power and its exercise; it 
therefore concerns the awareness individuals had of their own role, as well as the 
perception of that role by other individuals or by the state. To make it clear from the 
beginning, the Greek language until the 10
th
 c. attributed no specific social meaning to 
the term δυνατός. Its use in the Novels of Justinian is influenced by the Roman 
legislation, because δυνατός is the direct translation of potens. The potentes, 
potentiores or potentissimi are a dominant group in Roman legislation; their 
characteristic is not primarily one of social status, since they may well come from 
different classes of the Roman society, but the exercise of power −which can be 
delegated by the emperor−, or more accurately, of abuse and violence (vis), against 
the socially inferior (inferiores, humiliores)
72
. St. Basil the Great targets at their 
avarice and their rapacity, but the term in general is not frequent in the byzantine 
narrative sources, which use the term δυνάστης instead of potens.  
The Novels of Justinian I follow the Roman legal tradition and sketch a 
complete profile of the dynatoi: they are distinctly differentiated from the archons, 
who represent state authority in the provinces; when their activity is centered in cities, 
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it is placed under the jurisdiction of the ἔκδικοι (defensores)73. However, it was not 
the civic aspect that worried the government, but their activities in the provinces and 
indeed in those provinces in which civic civilization was not embedded in antiquity, 
such as Paphlagonia, Lycaonia, Cappadocia and others
74
. The δυνατοί in Justinian’s 
legislation are often very rich; their wealth allows them to maintain retinues of armed 
men (δορυφόροι, πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων οὐ φορητόν –bodyguards, a mob of awful 
people)
75
 and to buy the silence of state authorities (τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῖς 
ἐμφραττομένου χρυσίῳ –their mouth is choked up with gold), that turned a blind eye 
to the appropriation of state and imperial properties
76
. Quite often their activity is no 
different than that of bandits as they performed regular attacks on villages, to the 
detriment of peasant cultivators. The province of Lycaonia, after the official 
perception, “belonged to powerful men” (ἀνδρῶν γάρ ἐστιν ἰσχυρῶν); they were able 
“riders and archers”, disregarding the civil and military authorities, a phenomenon 
that the emperor attributed to the loose reinforcement of the rules, which made the 
law “not equally menacing to the most insolent” (φοβερὸν οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς 
θρασυτέροις)77.  
We owe this detailed profile of the powerful and their ways of operation in the 
6
th
 c. to the Novels of Justinian. The profile of the dynasts, on the other hand, is not 
that clear
78
. The terms δυνάστης and δυναστεία are particularly frequent in the 
Scriptures; in Greek they carry with them specific connotations which, unlike the 
Latin term potentes, are of political and social content and include conceptions about 
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authority and power
79
. Thus, a dynast in Greek notion is almost without exception one 
whose authority is officially recognized either by the state or by his own people or 
subjects, therefore a dynast can even be a king –in this respect it is important that the 
kings of the Hellenistic period are quite often dynasts
80
, and their authority is 
perceived as absolute and sometimes oppressive. In this context a dynast may very 
well be someone with a state function or title, or simply a rich person who possesses 
the means to implement his goals. The sources contrast the dynasts with the poor 
(πένητες, πτωχοί), by charging the first with avarice and exercise of violence against 
the latter
81
. Thus the δυνάσται of the Greek sources are distinguished for their wide 
social influence and for their social and political status, but their power is often 
oppressive and injurious to the socially weak. In the Life of St. Symeon the Salos we 
find: “patrons, whom you need against the dynasts, are good” (καλοὶ οἱ προστάται, 
οὓς ἔχετε ἐν ἀνάγκῃ πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας)82; and in the Life of Philaretos, the 
neighbors who appropriated the saint’s land are recognized as dynasts, but also 
Philaretos himself is a dynast for the people of the king, because his residence gives 
the impression that he is a man of considerable means
83
.   
The use of these terms by the writers of Byzantium is a matter of perception. 
Dynasts are incriminated when they operate outside the frame of the law. “A man who 
possesses dynasty but is not without means is unjustified when sinning by doing 
                                                 
79
 Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, ed. K. LATTE, vol. I, Copenhagen 1953, 482.89: δυναστεία· δύναμις; 
Suidae Lexicon, ed. E. BEKKER, Berlin 1854, 321: δυναστεύω: τὸ ἄρχω (hereafter Suda).  
80
 Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon, ed. K. LATTE, vol. II, Copenhagen 1966, 634.20: Μαύσωλος· ὄνομα 
δυνάστου.  
81
 H. DELEHAYE, Les saints stylites, Brussels, 1923, 165.10-12, 166.20-21 (Life of St. Alypius) 210.37-
211.2 (Life of St. Luke the Stylite).   
82
 A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE - L. RYDÉN (eds), Léontios de Néapolis, Vie de Syméon le Fou et Vie de Jean de 
Chypre, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique 95, Paris 1974, 61.12-14: καλοὶ οἱ προστάται, οὓς 
ἔχετε ἐν ἀνάγκῃ πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὕτως, ὡς τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς ἁγίους ἀγγέλους ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν 
ἱκετεύοντας. The same text calls the emperor δεσπότης.    
83
 L. RYDEN, The Life of St. Philaretos the Merciful written by his grandson Niketas. A Critical Edition 
with Introduction, Notes, and Commentary, Uppsala 2002, 62.50-51, 84.394 (hereafter Life of St. 
Philaretos).   
25 
 
injustice”, wrote the patriarch Photios84. In the same direction the Eisagoge aucta, a 
legislative compilation dated to between the 10
th
 and the 11
th
 c., contains a stipulation 
that possession of dynasty does not adjudicate evasion of legal consequences, which 
can be lifted only by imperial decree
85
. The 10
th
 c. legislation is indeed innovative 
with respect to exercise of dynasty, because it acknowledges that it can be exerted by 
those who are not dynasts by themselves, but are simply friends of dynasts and have 
the right “to speak freely” to them (κἂν μὴ δι’ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ’ οὖν διὰ τῆς ἑτέρων 
δυναστείας πρὸς οὗς πεπαῤῥησιασμένως ᾠκείωνται)86. Finally, the emperor Basil II 
put down in this Novel of 996 that dynasty is bequeathed from generation to 
generation (τὴν δυναστείαν διαδεχομένων); this means that the state acknowledged 
that dynasty is basically a family affair
87
.      
It is rather difficult to distinguish in the sources the power of individuals or 
families that existed independently of the emperor. For Byzantium we maintain the 
impression mostly of a centralized state, in which all developments evolved around 
the court and the emperor, with his tolerance at least, if not at his will and not with his 
own involvement. And it was really such a state; the competition for the possession of 
titles, offices and the corresponding remunerations has been well described in modern 
research
88
. But I need to draw attention to some details relating clearly how this type 
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of authority was exercised by the δυνάσται of Byzantium. Philaretos’ family 
apparently had no connections with Constantinople −at least this is what his Life’s 
author would have us believe, and here I accept this convention for the sake of 
argument
89
. The peasants in his village, and also others, e.g. the soldier Mousoulios
90
, 
run to him with their problems, and he was always willing to help with whatever was 
needed
91
. When the people of the emperor took the decision to stay at his house, the 
villagers again appeared with gifts that allowed Philaretos to extend a splendid 
hospitality to them
92
. This is, perhaps, the good side of dynasty; the text only reveals 
before us some aspects of the real social influence of people with means on the 
practical level of daily life. Many more details are included in the Strategikon of 
Kekaumenos, a text in which the author never uses the terms δυνάστης-δυναστεία to 
denote the authority of the powerful. On the contrary, the term is employed to 
describe the person who pursues those activities that the Novels of the 10
th
 c. 
denounce: it is so, for example, in the case of Noah, “who happened to be a dynast in 
Demetrias” and appropriated the land of the locals93.  
Still, for Kekaumenos, autonomous authority of local archons in the provinces 
is non-negotiable and independent; the emperor, who is pushed in the background of 
the narrative, is but a distant figure even when his authority is advocated in the 
provinces by his officers
94
. But in this case, the archons are not characterized as 
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dynasts. They are those to whom “the people of the country obey”95, even if they “stay 
at home”, with no official relation to the central authorities (εἰ καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἰδιάζεις, 
ὑποτάσσεται δέ σοι ὁ λαὸς τῆς χώρας)96, meaning that they hold no title or office97. 
Social influence is manifest in the fact that the people of the country invoke the 
authority of a local archon in their dealings with officers of the civil or military 
administration. These may relate to any affair, but in particular they concern the 
assessment of taxes. They claim to the local archon that “you are our master” (ἡμεῖς 
σὲ ἔχομεν αὐθέντην)98. But in the text of Kekaumenos, the most important aspect of 
that influence is their intervention ability in cases of dispute among peasants; their 
authority to pass judgment is accepted and recognized. A local archon may intimidate 
somebody (ἐκφοβῶν), provide advice (νουθέτει), impose fines (διὰ ζημίας) or even 
corporal punishments (διὰ δαρμοῦ) and humiliate (μετὰ ὕβρεως καὶ ὀνειδισμοῦ) the 
disobedient
99
. Still, Kekaumenos advises that one must be very careful when settling 
disputes in his region, because he might in the process alienate the friends (φίλους), 
comrades (συντρόφους) and like-minded (ὁμόφρονας) of those that he finds on the 
wrong side, his decisions might therefore turn against him and this might cause him 
the loss of his recognition, reputation, and in the end, his power or even his life
100
. In 
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this context a local dispute might in fact be settled without the intervention of central 
administration officers. The texts of Philaretos and Kekaumenos suggest that the 
dynasty of local archons is a reciprocal relation of the dynast with his “subjects”, a de 
facto exercise of authority which is accepted by the people and entails mutual 
concessions and obligations. A dynast might in fact be alienated from his power base; 
there is no dynast without his people.   
Imperial service enhances dynastic authority on a local level and opens the 
way to its expansion empire-wide. Bardas Skleros is a well-known archon marked in 
the sources for his dynasty
101
. A long digression interpolated in the Novel of the 
emperor Basil II of 996 and dated most probably to the end of the 11
th
 c. reveals how 
the civil wars under that emperor were explained by the Byzantines themselves a 
century later. According to the text, the Phocas family “possessed dynasty without 
interruption for generations” (ἀδιάδοχον… εἶχον τὴν δυναστείαν)102. But a letter of 
that same emperor, written probably in late summer or early autumn 987 and 
preserved by Michael Psellos in the end of his Chronography is astonishingly 
revealing in that respect. Its content relates not only to the enhancement of influence 
that comes with service, but also to its management by the imperial circles, to the 
expectations attached to it and to the imperial assertion of absolute power and 
supremacy facing dynastic sway and status. The epistle was addressed to Bardas 
Phokas immediately after news of his revolution had reached Constantinople, and 
probably holds some of the personal style of the emperor Basil II; it appeals to 
emotion, yet it is authoritative, aggressive and arrogant
103
.  
The first part of the epistle is summarized by Psellos himself, who qualified 
the privileges granted to Phokas after his return from exile as “satrapical 
benefactions” (σατραπικὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν εὐεργεσίας), and suggested that the emperor had 
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 Psellos, Chronographia I, 14.4-5; on Bardas Skleros see generally W. SEIBT, Die Skleroi. Eine 
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awarded to him a fortune befitting his office
104
. Then his narrative turns to direct 
speech as it copies the epistle: the emperor points out to Bardas Phokas that he had 
been “friend and ears and eyes of the king”, as he was placed in the hierarchy (τάξιν) 
higher than anybody else
105
. These, said Basil, resulted in the expansion of his 
dynasty: “from these you became celebrated and your dynasty enlarged” (ἐξ ὧν σὺ 
καὶ ἤκουες τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ δυναστεία ηὔξηται). But the emperor vigorously 
underlines his own part: “who is now he, who dismisses and appoints men to the 
supreme offices?” (Τίς δὲ ὁ παύων νῦν καὶ καθιστῶν τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς;)106. The 
emperor also reminds Phokas that he had been generous to his father, his brother and 
other relatives for his sake (σὴν χάριν, σοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα πάντων ἀνεχόμενος)107, and that 
a number of people also benefitted from his rise to power, as they were appointed to 
military and civil posts, even though they were “not distinguished for their ancestors” 
(ἐξ ἀπορίας προγονικῆς); from their position they were able to come to the acquisition 
of immense wealth, also by “committing injustices, secretly and openly” (ἀδικούντων 
λάθρᾳ τε καὶ προδήλως). Basil II noted that he kept silent and that none of them was 
charged, in the hope that Phokas’ alliance would effect the pacification of the 
unrest
108
. Cheynet has noted that it is very difficult to estimate the number of Phokas’ 
relatives and supporters who entered or re-entered imperial service in 978, but it is 
clear that it caused the war against Skleros to finally take a turn in favor of the 
emperor
109
. The emperor’s allegation about the ancestral obscurity of his relatives 
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Concerning the supporters of Phokas, it is interesting to compare the list of Skleros’ supporting and 
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may seem an exaggeration, and might even have sounded offensive to Phokas. But the 
epistle emphasizes on their previous absence of status and ties with the central 
administration (ἐξ ἰδιωτικῆς ταπεινότητος −from the humility of private life), and on 
their sudden elevation to higher authority (εἰς ὕψος ἀξιωμάτων −to the heights of 
offices). It is quite plausible that here not only relatives who belonged to noble 
lineages are meant, but also others from the wider social influence circles of the 
Phokas family. The last part of the epistle rather emphatically reveals that it was 
expected of Phokas to use those people for supporting the imperial claims to power. 
Here we should understand that not only those who held military command are meant, 
but also those who would be in a position to diffuse imperial power in the provinces 
from an administrative post. These people turning against him was certainly not part 
of Basil’s plans.    
The case of Bardas Phokas demonstrates the reciprocity in the relations of the 
government with the dynasts of the East; much as they were feared, they were also 
exploited for specific purposes and this was to the full knowledge of both
110
. Service 
undoubtedly multiplied the exercise of real social influence, but it would be 
oversimplifying to sustain that dynastic influence depended solely on, or grew 
exclusively from, service and income from the rewards of the imperial treasury
111
. 
Authority on a local level is not advocated just by the representatives of the king; 
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exercising authority on a local level is a de facto privilege of those who, in a medieval 
context, stand out in the place where they live for any reason, be it their wealth, their 
descent, their valor against the enemy, their philanthropy
112
. The people of the 
country recognize in them their protector from raiding enemies, their mediator with 
the central authorities, those who will help in their hour of need, as Philaretos was 
doing with the peasants of his village. This type of authority exists parallel to the 
imperial authority, it does not owe its subsistence to Constantinople, it is recognized 
and respected by the locals and depends on, and is nourished by, reciprocity among 
those partaking in it as its agents or as its supporters. The texts examined above 
suggest that also of importance was a delicate equilibrium of interests, pursuits and 
targets of its members; its maintenance was a difficult task and explains much of the 
fluidity of alliances observed in the 9
th
 and especially in the 10
th
 c. In its turn, this 
conclusion says a lot about the liberty of individuals to decide freely and in favor of 
their own interests who would they give their allegiance to and about its significance, 
but this is a subject that will not be discussed here
113
.  
 
IV. The poor, the wealthy, and the noble 
The testimonies clearly attribute to the dynasts the type of illegal exercise of 
authority that the Novels of the 10
th
 c. on land ownership attack. The governments of 
the 10
th
 c. consciously targeted at the expansion of social and political power resulting 
from the economic growth of leading figures in the provinces. The large mass of 
people of the lower social strata that the legislation of the 10
th
 c. calls “the poor” 
(πένητες), is a group already promoted to the center of imperial propaganda in the 8th 
c. with the prooimion of Ecloga. In the 10
th
 c. they were juxtaposed with “the 
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powerful”. But “the poor” remain, in spite of all the efforts, a group largely 
undefined; it was so in Byzantium as well. “The poor” are not that category of people 
towards whom philanthropy aims −they are not the “useless” (ἄχρηστοι), not the sick, 
not the aged, who are normally easily detectable in the sources, either because of the 
terminology used, or because of the description; rather, the poor are those who are 
able to survive on their own
114
. The general definition of the 2
nd
 c. included in the 
Digesta reflects the total worth of assets below which somebody was considered 
“poor”; it is duly included in Greek in the Basilica without further specification115. 
The chapter in which this definition is comprised relates to those who are excluded 
from bringing a lawsuit to court
116
. Byzantine legislation did not introduce any 
improvement regarding this point. However, unlike what has been sustained so far, 
there is no explicit prohibition for “the poor” to testify at court before the 9th c. The 
exclusion from the judicial process of the most susceptible to intimidation and bribery 
is not found in the Basilica, but, rather surprisingly, in the Eisagoge of patriarch 
Photios. There it is stated that “the poor do not testify” (οἱ πένητες οὐ 
μαρτυροῦσιν)117. Title 12.1 and 12.2 of the Eisagoge summarize from the Digesta 
22.5.2 and 22.5.3, as well as from Justinian’s Novel 90, analyzed above. The 
stipulations are repeated in the Procheiros Nomos, a compilation dated to 907 or 
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shortly after
118
. The reason for prohibiting the poor to testify at court is already found 
in the Digesta 22.5.3, and it is repeated both in the Eisagoge and Procheiros Nomos: 
it should be examined whether the witness is “rich or poor, lest he [: the witness] may 
readily swear falsely for the purpose of gain” (εὔπορος ἢ ἐνδεής, ὥστε διὰ κέρδος τι 
πλημμελῆσαι). The middle byzantine version of Justinian’s laws completely omits the 
condicio, apparently because by the early 10
th
 c. any such distinction had become 
obsolete; it does, however, maintain the distinction between witnesses, honest-
dishonest, rich or poor (τίμιος καὶ ἄμεμπτος ἢ ἄτιμος καὶ ἐπίψογος, εὔπορος ἢ 
ἐνδεής)119.   
Photios, who in all probability is responsible for introducing this novelty in the 
late 9
th
 c., has appeared already in this treatise. The influence his beliefs had on the 
spirit of the law has not been adequately studied so far. The patriarch explicitly states 
in the introduction of the Eisagoge that “equality of the law” (ἰσότητι νόμου) is for 
God a fundamental constituent of “order” (κόσμος), which is thus made “with 
harmony” (ἁρμονικῶς)120. The idea of “equality of the law”, then, is dominant in the 
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Eisagoge. In Title 12 specifically it is clear that the legislator aimed at the protection 
of the judicial process from a possible corruption of administering justice, and not at 
the establishment of a social distinction between the poor and the wealthy. The laws 
on witnesses in Byzantium prove that contesting the competence of a person to appear 
before a court of law either as an accuser, litigant or as a simple witness by accusing 
them of being poor (πένης), infames (ἄτιμος), or unknown (ἄγνωστος), was above all 
a legal argument produced by that party that pursued delaying tactics or had some 
other vested interest in the case. It is possible to decipher how this general principle 
worked in reality by combining our information about the rich with evidence on the 
poor.  
We have seen that the role of wealth in the perception of social position 
distinctions is insignificant. Thus it is defined already in the Digesta that “he is 
considered solvent who has sufficient property to satisfy any claim which may be 
brought against him by a creditor”. The stipulation is, as expected, repeated in the 
Basilica
121
. In the Ecloga Basilicorum, a collection of scholia dated to the 12
th
 c. 
(probably in 1142), we find an elucidating comment on the significance of financial 
position. According to the commentator, “the poor who own no landed property 
should stand trial when they are given a guarantor” (τοὺς δὲ πένητας καὶ μὴ ἀκίνητον 
ἔχοντας κτῆσιν μετὰ δόσεως ἐγγυητοῦ δικάζεσθαι). But the judge should examine if 
the defendant owned sufficient property to reimburse the plaintiff, in which case he 
should “consider him wealthy and do not ask of him to produce a guarantor” 
(πλούσιον τοῦτον εἰπὲ)122. The example given by the commentator appears to expand 
on stipulations of the Digesta and Basilica, which grant to the judge freedom of 
decision and to the litigants latitude for defending their own case. In this context, it 
appears that the possession of landed property is normally not connected with 
                                                                                                                                            
and Plato. Also see the analysis of J. LOKIN, The significance of Law and Legislation in the the Law 
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121
 Digesta, 50.16.234.1; Basilica, 2.2.225. 
122
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perceptions of poverty
123
, and that poor people had the option of taking a guarantor to 
appear at court
124
. Therefore, wealth and poverty are debatable in a legal context and 
the limit for crossing from the first to the second condition is not fixed, it rather 
adjusts to the actual circumstances of the trial, even if, in a real social context, neither 
situation can be concealed
125
. The ambiguity of these conceptions explains very well 
why so many laws of the 10
th
 c. focused on the πένητες (the poor) and the δυνατοί (the 
powerful). While the exercise of power against the economically, politically and, in 
the end, socially weak was easily perceived, the absence of real distinctions among 
the “classes” produced the effect that social position was not consolidated for the 
dominant groups, which remained thus open to potential attack, and that to the people 
at the lower end of the ladder some space was given for claiming their own rights.    
The long epistle no 187 of patriarch Photios is elucidating when it comes to 
the poor in relation to the wealthy. Photios answers to a question of the 
protospatharios and protasekretis Christophoros concerning the alienation of landed 
property with the purpose of withdrawing from the world (meaning, to be tonsured a 
monk). Christophoros had asked “which house is honorable” (ποῖος οἴκος ἔντιμος 
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I am, rich regarding the present case). See Ecloga Basilicorum, 77.3-5.  
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εἶναι δύναται;) if everything is sold126. Photios with indignation compared 
Christophoros to the emperor Julian, who allegedly posed the problem “how, if 
everything is sold, an honourable house is capable of doing anything?” (πῶς γὰρ 
πραθέντων ἁπάντων οἶκος ἔντιμος δύναταί τι ἢ οἰκία;)127. The emperor Julian was 
supposedly referring to the ancient idea about the support the rich, −in the question 
specifically the οἶκος ἔντιμος− were able to offer their dependents; the wealth of the 
wealthy was distributed to the people depending from the houses
128
. Christophoros, 
however, reversed the main idea by pointing out that the possession of wealth is 
essential for the preservation of honour, implying that its alienation leads to 
irreparable loss of nobility
129
. The argument effected the long answer of patriarch 
Photios, whose literary inspiration was not enough to conceal his fury. The patriarch’s 
arguments often contradict each other; the terminology and protypes used are Roman 
                                                 
126
 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.84, 248.  
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 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.11. In reality Photius is drawing his material from works of Theodore 
of Mopsuestia against the emperor Julian, see A. GUIDA, Replica a Giuliano Imperatore: adversus 
criminationes in Christianos Iuliani imperatoris, Biblioteca Patristica 24, Firenze 1994, no 6. The 
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See L. FRUCHTEL – O. STAHLIN – U. TREU (eds), Clemens Alexandrinus, Die Griechischen 
Schriftsteller 17, Berlin 1970
2
, vol. 3, ch. 13.1. Unfortunately there is no telling which of the two texts 
Christophorus read that would have incited him to write to Photius the letter that infuriated the 
patriarch so much. H.-G. BECK, Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich, München 
1959, 527, thought that Photios had written a polemic essay against the emperor Julian. Also see A. 
KAZHDAN, A History of Byzantine Literature (850-1000), ed. CHR. ANGELIDI, NHRF/IBR Research 
Series 4, Athens 2006, 16, who thought that Photios in epistle 187 questions the “principle of the divine 
origin of political power”. 
128
 The οἶκοι have been defined as holding a highly important social role in Byzantium as nuclei of 
social, economical and political life. See P. MAGDALINO, The Byzantine Aristocratic Oikos, in: The 
byzantine aristocracy, 92-111; IDEM, Honour, 185, 193-194, 196-200, 213; NEVILLE, Authority, 66-68.   
129
 The difference is very subtle but perceivable because of the syntax: ἔντιμος in the text of “Julian” is 
an epithet of οἶκος, which means that honour is an inherent characteristic of οἶκος, and because of that 
nobility noble houses diffuse their wealth to the people, in other words, it is their duty to do so; nobility 
exists in a house anyway and philanthropy springs from it. In Christophoros’ question, ἔντιμος is 
predicative to οἶκος, which means that it is acquired, not inherent; in this case it is the existence of 
wealth that leads to nobility, because with wealth the houses may proceed to donations and thus prove 
their nobility, in other words, wealth equals nobility.     
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(e.g. ἔντιμος-honestior, κτήτορες-possessores). Still, the epistle on the whole is an 
excellent example of rhetoric, as the patriarch strives to answer the problem from all 
possible sides. Photios devoted many lines to prove to Christophoros that the virtue of 
abstaining from one’s own possessions but also “from the possessions of neighbours” 
(τοῖς πλησίον ἐξιστάμενος τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας) brings with it more virtues of the same 
sort and contributes to personal accomplishment; on the contrary, to follow Julian’s 
advice, which makes “the hands of his citizens collect their fortune with the labour of 
others”, leads to avarice, deceit, and cruelty130. Photios asks Christophoros “avarice 
and tyranny are honorable to you?” (ἀλλ’ ἡ πλεονεξία, ἡ τυραννίς σοι τὰ ἔντιμα;)131, 
to declare that “the possessores were selling, not everybody, not the penetes” (ὅσοι 
κτήτορες, οὗτοι ἐπώλουν, οὐχὶ ἅπαντες, οὐδ’ οἱ πένητες)132.   
It appears clear that in the epistle two fundamental ideas are colliding: 
Christophoros appears to make of wealth an essential characteristic of nobility; it is 
that element, through which nobility is socially recognized, therefore insufficiency of 
means alienates nobility from the source of its projection and manifestation to society. 
Even though the argument of Christophorus appears to be an ingenious sophistry, we 
might recognize in it the grasp of the upper social strata to/of their resources; in this 
manner, wealth is inseparable from nobility and nobility becomes the cause of wealth, 
in other words, a nobleman must be rich, and, consequently, he must safeguard his 
assets from alienation. It is to this idea that Photios reacted so strongly. The patriarch 
implies that the penetes need their own piece of land to make a living, therefore rich 
neighbors should not seek to buy out their properties. Photios characterizes the one 
who buys the land of the poor as “lover of profit and riches” (φιλοκερδῆ καὶ 
φιλόπλουτον)133, and in the end wonders, “is everybody rich and nobody is poor, is 
there nobody living only on one’s own possessions?” (πάντες πλούσιοι καὶ πένης 
οὐδείς, οὐδεὶς δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν αὐταρκείᾳ μόνῃ βιούντων;)134. This idea is not at all 
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 Photios, Epistulae II, 187.78-79.  
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 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.251.  
132
 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.288-289. The affirmation refers to a citation from the Acts of the 
Apostles, 4.34-35.  
133
 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.215. 
134
 Photios, Epistulae II, no 187.225-227. I prefer the translation “living on one’s own possessions” for 
“ἐν αὐταρκείᾳ μόνῃ βιούντων” because I think it transfers the meaning better than “living on self-
sufficiency” in the context described here.   
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new; sufficing to one’s own possessions had already been a desideratum of St. Basil 
in connection with avarice. But autarkeia in this context concerns the rich, not the 
poor
135
; it does not relate to subsistence means after the platonic protype, but to the 
exploitation of resources of wealth. In the epistle of Photios, however, the concept is 
applied both to the wealthy and to the poor: their assets should be enough for them, so 
there would be no need for buying and selling land. The argument appears to be in 
favor of the poor; with his ideas Photios underlines the right of the poor to maintain 
an autonomous existence and to keep their property against the expansionist policies 
of their neighbors.  
If wealth is essential for the social projection of nobility, nobility itself is a 
rather elusive notion
136
. In a number of hagiographic texts it appears to be founded on 
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 P. TREVISAN, San Basilio. Commento al profeta Isaia, Corona Patrum Salesianum S. Graeca 5, 
Turin 1939, 37-41. ch. 150-151. Also see above the commentary on the proemium of Ecloga. On the 
idea of autarchy see A. LAIOU, Economic Thought and Ideology, EHB 3, 1125-1126; KAPLAN, Les 
hommes et la terre, 493-496.  
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 MAGDALINO, Court society, 218-219, contemplates on the most appropriate term to use for 
describing the upper social strata of Byzantium, to conclude that the term ‘aristocracy’ “is certainly less 
inappropriate than ‘nobility’”. I tend to disagree with this opinion; literally ἀριστοκρατία means “the 
rule of the ἄριστοι” and refers to an ideal philosophical desideratum, since the notion of ἄριστοι 
includes moral qualities, therefore the term ἀριστοκρατία is of political content and refers to the polity, 
πολιτεία, or πολίτευμα. The Byzantines were familiar with the content of the term −so was Attaleiates, 
the example of Magdalino. In my appreciation its significance is apparently the reason why it is 
generally not used in the byzantine sources −as opposed to the term ἄριστοι, which describes a 
particular group of people that possess specific qualities– but I reserve my judgement until I investigate 
the subject closer. Here I prefer the term “nobility”, because it refers to the most important 
characteristic that the Byzantine upper class claimed, meaning descent from an ancient, notable family. 
The corresponding terms, often found in the sources, are εὖ γεγονότες, εὐγενεῖς, εὐγένεια. Nevertheless I 
have already used the term “aristocracy” more schematically. On the term aristocracy see I. 
ANTONOPOULOU, La question de l’ “aristocratie” Byzantine. Remarques sur l’ambivalence du terme 
“aristocratie” dans la recherché historique contempotaine, Symmeikta 15, 2002, 257-264; EADEM, The 
issue of “Aristocracy” in Byzantium. A Novel Approach, in: Antecessor. Festschrift fur Sp. Troianos 
zum 80. Geburtstag, V. LEONTARITOU, K. BOURDARA, E. PAPAGIANNI (Hrg), Athen 2013, 67-70. Also 
see OSTROGORSKY, Aristocracy, 3-5; HALDON, Social élites, 170-174, who prefers the more general 
term “élite” for the nobility of service, wealth, etc.; and also P. MAGDALINO, Byzantine Snobbery, in: 
The byzantine aristocracy, 63-64; IDEM, Honour, 194-196, 201-204; KAZHDAN-RONCHEY, 
Aristocrazia, 61-66; KAZHDAN-MCCORMICK, Byzantine court, 167, 168; A. KAZHDAN – G. 
CONSTABLE, People and power in Byzantium. An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies, 
39 
 
indigenous descent of generations. The protype is ancient Greek; the rare term 
εὐπατρίδαι for the nobility is bound to the rights and privileges of citizenship, which 
normally include the possession of land, but not necessarily the possession of 
riches
137
. Thus in the Life of George of Amastris it is stated that his parents were 
“locals and notables” (εὐπάτριδες καὶ ἐπίσημοι); they were known “not for their 
immense wealth, not for their famous dynasty”, but for their piety138. In the Miracles 
of St. Nicholas it is explained regarding an eupatrides that “he was reduced to 
absolute poverty and because of this he appeared to have lost his nobility” (εἰς 
ἐσχάτην πενίαν ἐλάσαντος καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ εὐγενὲς ἀπολωλεκέναι δόξαντος)139. The 
concept of citizenship is specifically mentioned in the case of St. Nikephoros of 
Medikion, who was “an indigenous citizen of the all blessed Constantinople” (τῆς 
πανευδαίμονος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως αὐτόχθων πολίτης)140. The Life of Euthymios 
the Younger, who is recognized as coming from “noble parents” (γεννήτορες 
εὐπάτριδες), underlines the possession of the family’s landed property through their 
obligation to pay the taxes
141
. As in the case of dynasty, it may be concluded that 
nobility is recognized locally by the social environment of the nobles. But the 
majority of texts emphasize on state service and dependence, which enhances the 
nobility of the family and contributes to the prosperity of the relatives. Kallistos, for 
example, one of the martyrs of Amorion, is said to have enlisted in the imperial 
                                                                                                                                            
Washington, DC, 1982, 142-144 (hereafter KAZHDAN-CONSTABLE, People and power); CHEYNET, 
Aristocratie, 282-298; IDEM, Pouvoir, 249-259.    
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 Photii Patriarchae Lexicon, ed. CHR. THEODORIDIS, v. II, Berlin – New York 1998, 217.2279: 
εὐπατρίδαι· αὐτόχθονες καὶ μὴ ἐπήλυδες; ibid. 217.2283: εὐπατρίδαι· εὐγενεῖς (: Suda, 451). Citizenship 
also includes the right to sit at the boule of the city, therefore indigenous descent is a privilege par 
excellence. See The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius with the Scholia, ed. J. Bidez – L. Parmentier, 
London 1898 repr. Amsterdam 1964, 144.29-32: Ἐν τοῖς λευκώμασι γὰρ τῶν πόλεων οἱ εὐπατρίδαι 
πρόσθεν ἀνεγράφοντο, ἑκάστης πόλεως τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις ἀντὶ συγκλήτου τινὸς ἐχούσης τε καὶ 
ὁριζομένης.  
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 V. VASILIEVSKIJ, Russko-vizantijskie issledovanija, 2, St. Petersburg 1893, repr. in Trudy 3, 1915, 
4-6 (cited after the Hagiography database of Dumbarton Oaks).  
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 G. ANRICH, Hagios Nikolaos. Der Heilige Nikolaos in die griechischen Kirche. Texte und 
Untersuchungen, Bd. 1, Leipzig-Berlin 1913, 221.24-25.  
140
 F. HALKIN, La Vie de Saint Nicéphore fondateur de Médikion en Bithynie (+813), AB 78, 1960, 
396-430, here 405, ch. 5.8-13.  
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 L. PETIT, Vie et office de saint Euthyme le Jeune, Paris 1904, 16.20-21, 27-28.  
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service “for the prosperity of the relatives” (διὰ τὴν συγγενῶν εὐδοκίμησιν)142, and 
the patriarch Tarasios came from “patricians from a line of patricians” (ἐκ πατρικίων 
σειρᾶς πατρίκιοι)143. For the second half of the 11th c., the writers use the ancient term 
eupatridai to describe certain persons: those surrounding Isaakios I Comnenos in 
1057
144
, Romanos IV Diogenes
145
, Nikephoros III Botaneiates
146
, and, as expected, 
Alexios I Komnenos
147
. However, the use of the word in these instances betrays the 
classicizing trend of the time, since it is deprived of its ancient context.  
Emphasis on wealth in this framework often serves the narrative as the 
negative protype from which the hero disassociates himself in order to reach sanctity; 
it is indeed a first proof of purity of soul and holiness. The texts that elaborate on the 
riches of the families are quite well known: the Life of Philaretos the Merciful, the 
Life of Theophanes the Confessor and the Life of Michael Maleinos. Enumerating the 
sources of wealth, size of the land owned, number of flocks etc., appears to be an 
Aristotelian protype
148
, which, in Byzantium, is set in a Christian frame. It is quite 
characteristic that, while the author of the Life of Philaretos models the description of 
wealth on the Book of Job, thus profiling in reality a stock farmer, he adds the 
possession of forty-eight proasteia of good land by his hero; the implication is that 
Philaretos was not just a stock-breeding farmer, but a local archon, an εὐγενὴς –a 
nobleman− according to the text, with family roots of many generations in 
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 V. VASILIEVSKIJ – P. NIKITIN SKAZANIJA, O 42 amorijskich mucenikach, St. Petersburg 1905, 23 
(cited after the Hagiography database of Dumbarton Oaks; hereafter Life of Forty-two martyrs of 
Amorion).  
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 St. EUTHYMIADES, The Life of the Patriarch Tarasios by Ignatios the Deacon, BBOM 4, Aldershot-
Brookfield-Singapore-Sydney 1998, 4.3-5. 
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 Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis Historiarum, ed. I. THURN, CFHB V, Berlin-New York 1973, 500.87.
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 Michaelis Attaliatae Historia, ed. E. TSOLAKIS, CFHB 50, Athens 2011, 77.6-7.   
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 Ioannis Zonarae Epitomae Historiarum Libri XIII-XVIII, ed. T. Büttner-Wobst, CSHB, Bonn 1897, 
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 E. TSOLAKES, Η Συνέχεια της Χρονογραφίας του Ιωάννου Σκυλίτση (Ioannes Skylitzes Continuatus), 
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 Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, ed. E. Warmington, transl. J. Freese, London – Cambridge Mass. 
1926, repr. 1967, 50, 1361a.7: πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος καὶ γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις πλήθει καὶ 
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Paphlagonia
149
. In the Life of Theophanes the hero of the story disregarded the ideals 
of an aristocratic living altogether, fortune (πλοῦτος παφλάζων −splashing riches), 
physical appearance, life style
150
, but in the Life of Michael Maleinos family riches 
are inseparable from the notion of nobility and state service and they complete the 
noble profile of the Maleinoi
151
. The possession of land is used to add to the nobility 
of a person
152
. We find it in many saints’ lives; in a different source, the historical 
Life of Basil, the benefaction of Danelis explains a decisive stage in the ennoblement 
and social elevation of Basil, that of becoming a land owner, of becoming rich (καὶ 
γέγονε πλούσιος καὶ αὐτός), a development that allowed Basil to buy land and to aid 
his own people
153
.  
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th
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From what we have seen so far it becomes clear that we are dealing with two 
separate profiles for the possession of wealth: the first is connected with avarice and 
dynasty, whereby it refers to phenomena targeted in the legislation; the second is 
attached to nobility as its necessary component. The state did not generally disregard 
nobility or wealth, but, as we have seen above, attributed more significance to service. 
The emperor Leon VI, in an abstract much discussed of his Taktika
154
, binds nobility 
with active service in a manner that is immediately recognizable in the 9
th
-10
th
 c. 
through the use of its terminology, even if the abstract deviates only slightly from the 
Strategicus of Onasander
155
. Almost all the terms come from the ancient text: descent 
from a celebrated family “should be admired” (ἀγαπᾶν μὲν δεῖ τοῦτο); it gives 
someone fame (λαμπρύνεται), solemnity (σεμνύνεσθαι, in the sense of receiving 
office or title) and glory (δοξαζόμενοι)156. Harmonic combination of glorious ancestry 
and valor is proof of εὐτυχία, good fortune, meaning the concentration of admirable 
merits in one person. The crosswise schema included develops the ancient text with 
specific byzantine connotations: λιτοί in Byzantium −a term inserted by the byzantine 
author− were those who offered their services without any further distinction, such as 
simple soldiers; they, says Leon, will be rewarded for their deeds, but someone who is 
only known for his descent will remain ἄπρακτος, meaning without function or any 
other distinction, if he does not possess the virtues needed to serve
157
. Leon allowed 
the characterization ἄχρηστοι (useless) of Onasander for the generals who show no 
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virtue, and ἀριστεία (excellence) for the performance of simple soldiers. With this the 
emperor equates noblemen without virtues with that category of people who offer 
nothing to the polity, while on the other hand attributes a par excellence moral quality 
of the aristocracy to simple soldiers with the purpose to highlight their bravery
158
. A 
single phrase totally original betrays the emperor’s thoughts about nobility: “this is 
how we should evaluate the nobility of men, not from descend from [a noble] lineage, 
but from their own deeds and accomplishments” (οὕτω χρὴ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων εὐγένειαν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πράξεων καὶ 
κατορθωμάτων)159.  
So, for the emperor, valor only proves, and is worthy of, nobility. Nobility 
may very well exist outside the circles of those under strateia and noblemen could 
indeed be private persons, ἰδιῶται. In this case nothing restricted its theoretical 
justification, its beliefs and the modes of its self-projection to society. But if it lay at 
the disposition of the emperor and came under the strateia obligation, the interest that 
its extraordinary accomplishments be used for the common good is explicit. Leon VI 
is also rather apologetic towards wealth: “we do not repudiate the rich because he is 
rich” (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸν πλούσιον ἀποδοκιμάζομεν ὅτι πλούσιος), but a rich person 
should not be appointed to a high military command on account of his riches, but only 
on account of his merits
160
. The originality of the emperor
161
 sharply contrasts with 
the conclusions of another writer of the 10
th
 c., who also copied the text of Onasander, 
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society, 230; KAZHDAN-MCCORMICK, Byzantine court, 172 (the authors consider the text as proof of 
“vertical mobility”); CHEYNET, Aristocratie, 296-297; KAZHDAN-RONCHEY, Aristocrazia, 68-69; 
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but reached the exact opposite decision by choosing decisively the wealthy over the 
“poor” general (πλούσιον μᾶλλον ἢ πένητα −rather the rich than the poor)162. This 
judgment on nobility, virtue and wealth, is in line with similar views written by 
Photios in the Vassilikos andrias in honor of Leon VI, allegedly on behalf of his 
father, Basil I. In that text the patriarch discredits nobility and wealth before virtue, 
and descent before friendship
163
.   
It is clear that the profiles that have been sketched so far do not coincide. The 
official views maintained about the “aristocracy” in Byzantium demanded the 
delivering of active services to the emperor and the empire, while on the other hand 
rendered at least suspect the possession of wealth and the inclination of rich and noble 
families to increase their economic basis. At about the same time Leon VI produced 
the Taktika, another text confirms this approach. The Taktikon of Philotheos is dated 
to 899 and his statement has been taken as proof that hierarchy in Byzantium was 
centred at the royal court. But Philotheos says more than that, as he proclaims that 
“nobility” (περιφάνεια βίου) in the sense of “celebrated honour of titles” (ἔνδοξος 
ἀξιωμάτων ἀξία) is perceptible and meaningful only when someone is invited to dine 
with the emperor
164
. According to this proclamation, service and the duties attached to 
it attribute to those who undertake them περιφάνεια, the nobility in life. The right to 
dine with the emperor was awarded, according to the Taktikon, to all those who 
served, from the highest dignitaries, to the people of the palace, down to the simple 
soldiers that were duly included in the list, who were also under obligation of strateia. 
Philotheos then, in reality stated that all nobility, all wealth, that anybody might 
possess is of no importance to the imperial power, unless it lies at its service.  
One might wonder if these texts, when they reached the public, raised any 
questions or objections, especially from the families that were represented at the 
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hierarchy of the palace. Reaction is very hard to trace, but we could perhaps deduce 
that the aristocracy in middle Byzantium was found in a position to have to assert its 
nobility in the frame of a state that did not officially recognize it and did not formally 
consolidate it under the law. However, the system may have worked both ways: while 
it attracted those who possessed the means to real power, who were thus obliged to 
use their charismas, such as their good reputation, their training and wealth, for the 
benefit of the state, it was also a way for people of the upper social strata to enhance 
their nobility, if they already had it, to advertise their line of birth and to benefit from 
the generous rewards. No source is more characteristic for the declaration of nobility, 
founded on the services provided to the state, than the Life of Michael Maleinos
165
. 
For families that were wealthy, but did not technically count for aristocratic, it was 
possible to acquire nobility. We learn for example that a keroullarios at the beginning 
of the 9
th
 c. gave up almost his entire fortune for the privilege of dining with the king. 
The note of the chronographer −no other than Theophanes the Confessor, of an old 
Constantinopolitan family−, συναρίστησόν μοι (dine with me), already anticipates the 
Taktikon of Philotheos almost a century earlier. It is not very clear what the objection 
of Theophanes was, and whether it concerned the large amount of money paid by the 
man in exchange for a title, or his humble origin, since he was but a 
Constantinopolitan entrepreneur
166
. But the event clearly indicates that the practice of 
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title and/or function purchase by the wealthy businessmen of Constantinople, was not 
confined only to the 11
th
 c., even though it might have costed them more than the 
normal purchasing prices.   
 
V. The state and the powerful  
The government was, as we have seen, willing to turn a blind eye to the 
misdemeanors of the nobles, especially in the provinces, where imperial power was 
harder to reach. The contour was flexible and not very austere, provided that the 
nobles supported the emperor’s authority in the country. But in the 10th c. the social 
influence of the nobles became a source of concern on occasion of an increase of 
small properties alienation by the lower middle class landowners that followed the 
heavy winter of 927/8. To deal with this problem the government promulgated a 
series of Novels of unprecedented austerity and complexity for their social 
ramifications
167
. The traditionalist approach chosen by the legislator is rather 
disorienting
168
; indeed, the departing point of the legislation is the ancient Roman 
term δυνατοί, potentes, and the phrasing of the texts, loaded with references to St. 
Basil and St. Chrysostom, obscures the real novelties included in them. But these laws 
in effect merged the profiles of the powerful and the dynasts into one, by attributing to 
the first the qualities that normally belonged to the latter, meaning the exercise of real 
and often repressive power on the part of the politically and socially distinguished. 
Moreover, the Novel of 934 confined this group to the representatives of the upper 
social strata and specifically to the so-called “nobility of service”169. As a 
consequence, this stratum in Byzantium was officially incriminated for its social 
influence, its authority and wealth.  
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The Novels expose the networks of the powerful, which included not only 
relatives by blood or marriage, but also those belonging to their houses, the οἰκεῖοι 
−persons with close ties with the families−, as well as persons employed for carrying 
out their transactions
170
. They also explain the methods for expanding their resources 
and their access to manpower; these concerned direct exercise of authority, violence 
and deceit
171
, a series of legal contracts resulting in ownership alienation (such as 
donation, bequest, endowment and others)
172
, and known methods of social promotion 
such as adoption and marriage
173
. Because of promise of προστασία (protection), 
συνδρομὴ (assistance) and εὐεργεσία (benefaction)174, the persuasive methods of the 
“powerful” could be extremely successful. Social activity and influence that was, as 
we have seen, normal for dynasts such as Philaretos and Kekaumenos, was targeted, if 
not condemned, by the legislation of the 10
th
 c. This gave the opportunity to litigants 
of different social provenance to question the motives and the sincerity of their 
opponents, to stigmatize them as “powerful” and to overturn decisions and annul 
contracts, independently of the truthfulness of their allegations. How successful this 
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legislation was in the 10
th
 c. is demonstrated simply by the number of the Novels 
promulgated for this purpose, which dealt with specifications regarding the details of 
the transactions that had been taking place. The particular concern of the legislators to 
define the “powerful” in comparison to others in the same social context, e.g. in the 
village communities or in the army
175
, is indicative, once again, of the absence of real 
social boundaries in Byzantium. But in my opinion there can be no doubt that the 
legislation of the 10
th
 c. on landownership was detrimental to the financial interests of 
the “nobility of service”. The servants of the empire were found with their back 
against the wall, as they were indiscriminately branded with avarice, deceit and 
arrogance, a negative protype that was thus formalized and was reproduced even in 
the 11
th
 c.  
With the reservation that the legal sources transmit the official perception 
about the byzantine “nobility of service”, and do not reproduce the general public 
opinion about its members, we must admit that their profile is not at all flattering. The 
Novels relating to the protection of small and medium landowners have been mostly 
explained against the background of an increasing competition for the control of 
manpower and resources. But it appears to me that the protection of the πένητες, the 
poor, is only a vehicle for checking the social influence of the “powerful”176. The 
legislators of the 10
th
 c. recognized that social power was mainly not a product of 
“nobility”, but of that particular position created by state dependence, and as such the 
field of its application could expand to include those social contexts in which no 
nobility existed; a good example showing this is that simple soldiers were considered 
as socially superior compared to other farmers in a village
177
. The problem is partly 
interwoven with the profile of the so-called “military aristocracy”, which I intend to 
examine closely in the near future, but from which I will here bring forward two 
pieces of information. The Novels regarding the dynatoi provide clear definitions 
about who exactly could be considered dynatos and in which context. This alone 
proves that there was a real interest in the provinces to exploit the opportunity 
provided by the new laws against those who could be included in the category of the 
powerful. A series of particular cases was examined, and among them those that 
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concerned the military. In Novel 5 of 947 the emperor Constantine VII without any 
reservations called the military “corrupt, remiss in their duty, without any war 
experience, less noble than ants, more rapacious than wolves, who ripped off the 
money of the empire’s subjects because they could not tax the enemy”178. A few years 
later, in a letter addressed to Michael Maleinos but written allegedly on behalf of the 
emperor Romanos II, Theodore of Cyzicus
179
 expressed his admiration to Michael, 
because he had forsaken the way of living of his closest relatives, “who all concern 
themselves with thriving on, and prospering through, their own sword in life, and who 
might hurry to appropriate all that belongs to their neighbours”180.  
We might object that these protypes are not new, they are simply conventions 
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applied to the military section of the aristocracy of Byzantium. In reality, as I will 
argue elsewhere, these profiles are very ancient. But there is no other time in 
Byzantium that they are detected more clearly, than in the 10
th
 and 11
th
 c. In his letter, 
Theodore of Cyzicus could have chosen an expression more neutral rather than openly 
accusing Maleinos’ relatives with bellicosity and greed that is only satisfied with the 
use of the sword. On the whole the epistle contains unprecedented aggressiveness and 
poisonus irony that sends a clear message to Michael Maleinos: “even if the treasures 
coming from just sources would diminish, I wish I could make sure that the worthy 
would become rich in one day and that goods would spring forth for my subjects as if 
from a perpetual river and that nobody, whose misery I would not be able to crush 
quickly, would be miserable”181. I remind to the reader that Romanos II is the emperor 
who annulled altogether and without reimbursement all property alienations to the 
powerful that had taken place after 945, independently of motives and circumstances 
in which they had taken place
182
.        
 
VI. An expression of imperial omnipotence: taxis  
The enhancement of the profiles discussed above in the 10th c. proves that 
their use by the central authorities intensified, therefore the tension between the 
government and the byzantine aristocracy suddenly becomes more visible in the same 
period −to culminate, in my opinion, in the 11th c. The phenomenon may be 
interpreted as a direct consequence of the strengthening of central authority observed 
under the Macedonian emperors. The state nourished the idea that exercise of power 
is arranged around a central source, which is represented on earth only by the imperial 
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authority. The ultimate power, the “power of authority” (ἐξουσίας δυναστεία) in the 
words of the emperor Leon VI
183
, only belongs to the emperor. Political and social 
influence and power is asserted at the emperor’s command or with his permission; 
other power poles are organized around him hierarchically, with absolute discipline 
and without objections. This conception of authority is strongly evocative of the ideas 
expressed in the Dialog De scientia politica; nevertheless, the fact that in middle 
Byzantium the emperor’s role in the hierarchy as a central source of power is 
enhanced, is fundamentally different from the idea expressed in the Dialog, where, as 
we have seen, the emperor appears only to confirm the role of the optimates, who 
trusted in their own position. In the 10
th
 c. the nobles, the ἄριστοι, only derive their 
existence, their significance and social and political position from the center. This 
perception on the whole reflects a different application of the notion of τάξις, which is 
excellently propagated in the prooimion of De Cerimoniis
184
. In the prooimion of that 
text, the whole idea is reversed and turned to the benefit of imperial power.   
The idea of τάξις as an inherent and indispensable component of a harmonious 
polity was developed by Aristotle
185
. Pseudo-Dionysius, who elaborated on ideas of 
Proclus
186
, believed that τάξις is an inherent characteristic of ἱεραρχία (hierarchy); 
hierarchy is a method of return towards God
187
. This theory seems to underlie 
Constantine Porphyrogennetus’ theory on imperial authority, which is contained in 
the prooimion of De Cerimoniis. The emperor Constantine VII states that imperial 
authority is governed by taxis (διὰ τῆς ἐπαινετῆς τάξεως) because thus it is ordered 
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(δεικνυμένης κοσμιωτέρας) and for this it is admired188. The emperor then makes an 
interesting remark, as he compares a “royal polity” (βασιλικοῦ πολιτεύματος) without 
taxis, with “private and unfree life” (ἰδιωτικῆς καὶ ἀνελευθέρου διαγωγῆς)189, to 
conclude that when the imperial power (βασιλείου κράτους) is ruled by rhythm and 
taxis in reality it replicates “the harmony and motion of the Creator” (τοῦ δημιουργοῦ 
τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ κίνησιν)190. Constantine VII here frames a basic Aristotelian idea, 
taxis, within a Neo-Platonic context but takes it even further: freedom is the principle 
that underlies sharing in authority, and the polity is a community of free people
191
, 
therefore for someone not participating in the polity means not only that one chooses 
private life, as Aristotle said
192
, but that his life is not free. The ἰδιῶται (private 
persons) are in reality “unfree”, and for them there is no reason of distinction. Once 
again, true merit is acknowledged only to those who choose to serve in the context of 
imperial taxis.  
It is impossible not to bring the proemium of De Cerimoniis into association 
with a well known extract of Symeon the New Theologian, in which, however, there 
is no mention of taxis. But the writer, like Constantine VII, contrasts the persons who 
choose a private life away from public affairs, “who stay at their own houses”, or 
“live in their proasteia”, or “show cowardice and waste their time at home enjoying 
the luxury” with those who “pay a service to the earthly king”, who follow him 
everywhere, serve in the army and show their bravery in the battlefield. Symeon 
rather sees a pyramid below the emperor, who is found at its top. Through the archons 
the emperor is able to reach each and every subject of his empire: “the generals and 
all the archons, of which some are acquaintances and servants, some are even 
friends, and through each and every one of them also the people that obey to them, all 
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are subjected to the emperor”. Thus the emperor’s authority spreads from the top to 
the bottom of the empire’s social structure; dependents of the notables, the generals 
and archons that are specifically mentioned, those who are affiliated with the grand 
houses notwithstanding their status, all the people belong to the king, just like all 
people are servants of God
193
.   
In the context described by Symeon the particular relations of the people with 
the archons are of no interest, because in reality it is the authority of the emperor that 
governs all relations. According to this perception, the archons acquire their 
importance because they are the vehicle through which imperial rule is diffused to the 
lower social strata; the dependence of the latter from the archons, if it exists, only 
serves imperial omnipotence. In reality, this model brings the relations that, as we 
have seen, could develop between archons, dynasts or “powerful”, with people at the 
other end of the social ladder, under a state cover. The possibility, or rather the fact, 
that these relations existed well outside the frame described by Symeon is not 
examined in this theoretical model. On the contrary, the social dominance of the 
emperor in Symeon’s text is encompassing and is founded on the belief that “all 
people belong to the king”. It is not surprising that Symeon the New Theologian 
described the expansion of imperial authority in such a manner, since in his youth he 
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was a member of the court
194
. The possibility that he was influenced by the proemium 
of De Cerimoniis cannot be excluded, but in any case the interdependence of the texts 
should be further investigated.    
 
VII. Conclusions     
There are many more observations that one can make about social distinctions 
in the middle byzantine times and many more groups whose social profile needs to be 
investigated. But the fact remains, and this is of capital importance for understanding 
byzantine society, that there were no clear social barriers between the “classes” of 
Byzantium. This created a particular social fluidity, a mobility that is manifest in the 
rise of certain persons to power, of which the most notable cases are those of Justin I 
and Basil I. The estimate, however, is somewhat superficial. Justin would not have 
ascended the throne had he not been enrolled in the only guards regiment that did not 
require a large sum of money for enlisting
195
, and Basil would not have had the 
chance to claim supreme power had he not sought to enter the clientele circles of 
powerful people such as Theophilos the droungarios of the Vigla
196
, which allowed 
for his social elevation and the improvement of his economic situation. Social 
developments and the legislation of the late Roman empire reinforced the imperial 
authority and in the process contributed to the loosening of social barriers. The class 
that was damaged the most from this process was the aristocracy, and this created 
tensions already in the 6
th
 c., which are detected, as we have seen, in the Dialog De 
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scientia politica and −what is mostly known− in the Anecdotes of Prokopios. Under 
the influence of Justinian, the emperor Justin I probably abolished the last obstacle 
that forbade social upgrading to people belonging to the infames by proclaiming with 
a famous law that their social improvement was possible under conditions
197
. The 
rights of the aristocracy were generally interwoven with the power and the social 
delimitation of the senate. But Justin under the influence of Justinian produced a law 
that transferred the decision about men admitted into the Scholae to the emperor. The 
measure, apart from its economic consequences
198
, in time apparently contributed to 
the transformation of the aristocratic senatorial hierarchy into a hierarchy centred at 
the palace, in which the opinion of the emperor about the people surrounding him 
mattered the most; it further increased the authority of the emperor about deciding 
who, under what circumstances and for what purpose would a person, independently 
of descent or economic influence, be accepted at the inner power circles of the 
palace
199
. This development is evident in seal inscriptions by the early 8
th
 c.
200
 and in 
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the long run undermined the senate, its aristocratic composition, prestige and power.   
And yet no convincing argument can be articulated that would prove that there 
was no real aristocracy in Byzantium. What we see in the sources and is puzzling 
concerning the existence or not of a delimited upper stratum is only the absence of its 
legal consolidation. No law ever secured special handling for any member of the great 
families. On the one hand, this resulted in the renovation and mobility of the 
aristocracy, which was additionally augmented by the emperor’s right to appoint men 
of his own choosing to higher positions in the hierarchy. But most importantly, it 
created insecurity among those found at the top of the social ladder, since their 
position, their prosperity and its maintenance was only conditional, to the point that 
consolidation of position remained a desideratum until the late 11
th
 c. Conversely, 
noble families were under no restriction whatsoever to project to their environment 
their nobility, by taking pride in their lineages, their noble parents, or by displaying 
their wealth, but their standing was not enshrined in a systemic social frame. Without 
legal or political investment, “nobility”, therefore “aristocratic” identity, remained 
until the late 11
th
 c. a subject of ideological proclamation and of self-projection. The 
governments of the 9
th
-10
th
 c., asserted very strongly their role in the creation and 
maintenance of that nobility. They did not really deserve such an assertion; as we 
have seen, there are specific conditions −of economic, political, social and military 
nature− that favour the rise of the aristocracy. Indeed, the aristocracy exists based on 
its exceptional gifts that it claims for itself and that are recognized by others, and 
these concern, as has been noted above, par excellence descent −including locality− 
and wealth, as well as its claim to virtues −philanthropy, bravery etc− and physical 
appearance. In my opinion it cannot be doubted that some kind of antagonism of the 
upper social strata with the emperors of the Macedonian dynasty existed and led to the 
fabrication of the myth about the descent of its founder, the emperor Basil I, to match 
the myths of other families
201
. But it is not just about descent.  
The evidence examined here suggests that this competition was fully 
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developed in the 10
th
 c. The rulers of the Macedonian dynasty were always conscious 
that at least some part of the aristocracy was at times, or even constantly, on the 
lookout for an opportunity to claim the throne. The system worked for the benefit of 
the state by pulling the nobles and their resources towards it. Thus it can also be seen 
as an element of unification, of the rallying of the upper social strata around the 
emperor and of minimizing the danger posed by centrifugal forces in the provinces. In 
this context, the question why Romanos I Lakapenos suddenly allowed for the 
nobility of service to be targeted in the legislation of the 10
th
 c. may remain forever 
without a convincing answer −at this point I have to underline again that, delimiting 
the group of the “powerful” to the nobility of service, is a true novelty of the 
byzantine legislation. We could interpret this development in terms of political 
sympathies; it is well known, for example, that certain families, notably the Phokas 
and the Maleinoi, were rivals of Romanos I
202
, so the possibility cannot be excluded 
that the emperor was seeking to restrain opposition to his regime. Another option for 
explaining the law of 934 would be to acknowledge that it was all about resources of 
wealth, meaning the possession of land and manpower, which is specifically recorded 
in the Novel
203
. But 10
th
 c. laws on landownership in reality channelled underlying 
political and social dissension against the nobility and the modes of its social and 
economic operation under the pretext of the care for the poor. In fact, they created a 
potentially dangerous political environment, since the people that were called to 
provide their services to state and government were attacked at the foundations of 
their position, meaning their wealth and their social influence. This contradiction 
created a potentially explosive political mixture that was found at the centre of 
politics in the 10
th
 c.: the emperors of the Macedonian dynasty incriminated their own 
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civil and military servants
204
.  
The proclamation that nobility exists only around the emperor was meant to 
reinforce the emperor’s role against the nobility’s deep social entrenchment and 
vindication of its rights. In effect it was declared in the most clear and official manner 
that there existed in Byzantium only one source of power, only one creator of social 
distinction. It was the outcome of a process, which, as we have seen, liberated the 
lower social strata from their Roman bondage and gave them space for social and 
economic growth under the law. But at the same time this development effected the 
disappearance of separate groups of the upper social strata. Distinction bound 
exclusively to state hierarchy for the noble, and abrogation of social limits, for people 
at the other end of the ladder −and, we should add, for those in between−, as these are 
protrayed in the legislation of the 6
th
 c. and later, are the two sides of one and the 
same evolution, which was made possible only under the protection of an almost 
almighty emperor. The absence of real and institutionalized social barriers favored 
this particular fluidity of society in Byzantium. As we have seen, this involved the 
containment of the nobility to the ungracious role of state servant. Indeed, Byzantium 
used the theory of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite not for securing the position of 
the upper social stratum, or for confining the other classes to an inferior and 
unchanging situation, but for strengthening the central authority with the aid of the 
law. The law sprang only from imperial autocracy and demanded this particular type 
of “social equality” with the purpose that justice be served better. This principle, 
which is already detected in Justinian I’s legislation205, could only be implemented 
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with −in reality it would not have worked without− the levelling of social distinctions, 
that placed the state at the centre of social organization and order. The result is very 
clear: the “aristocracy” in the end only had the ephemeral certainty of being awarded 
the privilege to “dine with the emperor”, that could be taken away at any given 
moment. In effect, the byzantine nobility was unable to secure its position against 
infringement of its rights by the imperial authority; on the contrary, “the poor”, 
meaning the socially “weak”, were awarded latitude to claim their own rights. In a 
sense then, Byzantium was much more a “modern” state than any of its western 
contemporary states. This was the inheritance of middle Byzantium, one that the 
Komnenoi appropriated, in spite of the fact that, under Alexios I, for the first time the 
aristocracy consolidated its position in the new hierarchical system. But the parallel 
existence of a nobility that based its excellence on its relation to the imperial family, 
of a powerful central authority and of a still fluid society, in the long run created 
problems that became obvious in the period that followed, especially after 1261 under 
the Palaeologan dynasty.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
to the administration of justice. Justinian I made the three parts of the Codex the only source of law, 
thus unifying its application and reinforcement throughout the empire; he forbade its corruption 
through the addition of comments, and ordered the clarification of obscure points and elimination of all 
contradictions; he finally ordered that copies should be sent to each province of the empire. The effort 
taken for the unification of the law, its expansion and uniform application, which would facilitate, in 
the eyes of the legislator, that all subjects be equally received and judged in a court of law, was 
unprecedented and was complemented with administrative measures designed to strengthen the 
authority of local judges. To borrow the words of a reference quoted above, Justinian I in reality 
created a “laws’ empire”. LOKIN further explains that Justinian’s idea of the law was a secular one (a 
Roman idea, if I may add), but it led to the formulation that the law springs only from God and that the 
emperor is His instrument for establishing justice on earth, which is clearly found in the Eisagoge of 
Photios.  
